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Abstract
Seven AEF deployments have been accomplished in the Southwest Asia area of
responsibility; none have met the Air Force's stringent 72-hour criterion. This
exploratory study quantifies the responsiveness capability of the AEW concept. Based
on a Monte Carlo simulation methodology this study concludes that the on-call AEW at
Mountain Home AFB does not have the capability to meet the 72-hour criterion.
Additionally, this study examined the effect of three departures from the baseline
model on responsiveness capability. These departures included: increasing airlift
throughput capacity, incorporating limited airlift failure, and employing an air-refueling
scenario. The simulation models incorporating these departures resulted in the respective
approximate probabilities of 90%, 0%, and 28% for meeting the 72-hour criterion. The
limitations of this study are discussed in the context of both the results and their
implications, and future research is suggested toward quantifying policy/resource
alternatives to assist senior Air Force decision-makers.

IX

AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF THE
RESPONSIVENESS CAPABILITY OF THE
AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING (AEW) CONCEPT

I. Introduction

Background
In the post-Cold War era (1989 - present), the Air Force experienced severe
downsizing effects due to changes in National Military Strategy (NMS). Prior to 1989,
the Air Force's role in the strategy of deterrence was significant and clearly defined. The
Air Force's long-range bomber fleet and their inter-continental ballistic missiles
combined to create two of the three facets of the nuclear triad (24:54). The evolution of
NMS; however, from nuclear deterrence to power projection/forward presence following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, prompted the military services to redefine their
supporting roles (5:4; 49:66).
In conjunction with the change in NMS, consensus was reached by congressional
leadership that Department of Defense (DOD) force levels attained by the build-up
during the Cold War were no longer necessary in this New World Order. The manning
levels for the DOD were reduced 30% from their Cold War numbers. The Air Force
experienced the greatest percentage of cuts due to its large stake in the deterrence role.
Air Force active-manpower decreased 37% and permanent overseas bases were decreased
from 50 to 17 during this era. In addition to downsizing issues, the Air Force's inability
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to define its role in the new NMS contributed to considerable force modernization
problems (23:18-19; 24:54).
The Air Force's difficulties in defining its own role and marketing this role to
Congress in the post-Cold War era were summed up by Colonel Wages:
Although US AF had been the first service to begin reorganizing for postCold War downsizing, had identified its ability to underwrite future national
security needs in the 1990 white paper Global Reach-Global Power, and
had orchestrated an aerial campaign in Operation DESERT STORM that
proved airpower's ability to win wars, the Air Force found itself struggling
for a constituency after 1991. (49:66)
The Air Force's sister services were much more adept at marketing their niches in the
New World Order. The Navy focused on its carrier-dominated forward presence
capabilities, while the Army promoted its identity within the new NMS as a
peacekeeping/peacebuilding force. The Marines also marketed themselves by promoting
to Congress their effectiveness in noncombatant evacuation operations. The Air Force,
alone, failed to develop and market its role in the new NMS. Consequently, force
modernization efforts met severe political opposition (49:66-67).
Political opposition manifested itself through congressionally mandated
requirement reductions. Air Force plans to purchase 120 new C-17 airlift transports were
thwarted by a resistant Congress and new purchases were capped at 40. The continuation
of the acquisition program for the F-22 fighter was politically threatened, and the longrange bomber force saw its numbers decrease by two-thirds down to 184 active aircraft
(49:66). The outlook for the Air Force was grim. Colonel Haffa illustrated this dim
perspective when he remarked, "It is not the world in which the Air Force grew up and

prospered. It could be a world in which the Air Force, as we know it will not survive"
(24:58).
As late as 1994, USAF leadership was searching to define the Air Force's role in
contributing to NMS. In October 1994, President Clinton executed Operation
VIGILANT WARRIOR in response to the massing of Iraqi armor and troops near
Kuwait's northern border. U.S. Central Air Force's (USCENTAF) Commander,
Lieutenant General John Jumper, deployed to Riyadh as the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC). The operation involved the deployment of several thousand
personnel and over forty aircraft from Continental U.S. (CONUS) bases (46). During the
deployment General Jumper observed that "the Iraqis ceased rattling their sabers when
the first air augmentees arrived in theatre" (49:68).
The quick retreat of Iraqi troops from the border dispelled the crisis; however, the
deployment costs incurred by the US government were high. General Jumper's
observations as JFACC led him to two conclusions:
(1) a relatively small, well-rounded combat force capable of immediate reaction
from the US was necessary to deal with unexpected fast-breaking contingencies,
and (2) such a force actually could have the same deterrent value as a much
larger, less agile force. (49:68)
In addition, Jumper reasoned that the deployment of such a force could achieve the same
deterrent objectives at a lower overall cost than larger deployments of forces. General
Jumper's conclusions from Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, coupled with the Air
Force's need to develop power projection and forward presence options, led his staff at
USCENTAF to create the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept (49:68). Until October

1995, the AEF concept consisted of a collection of staff summary predictions within the
USCENTAF staff (46).
In October 1995, U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) Commander in Chief
(CINC) gave General Jumper a chance to validate his concept. Due to the cutbacks
within the Navy, continuous coverage during aircraft carrier rotations was not possible.
USCENTCOM's CINC requested an AEF to compensate for the gap in carrier coverage
(5:3; 38:6). The subsequent deployment of eighteen F-16 aircraft to Bahrain in the
Southwest Asia (SWA) Area of Responsibility (AOR) was the first AEF (31:7). To date,
seven AEFs have been completed, and the AEF concept has made significant progress
since AEF I in 1995 (11:2-20).

Problem Statement
The USAF Chief of Staff, General Michael Ryan, recently announced his
intentions for converting the Air Force to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). His
plan calls for ten AEFs and two on-call Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs) to be created
by 1 January 2000 (42). Each of the AEFs will be available at specific times of the year
"to meet the nation's steady state contingency requirements" (15:2). The AEWs, on the
other hand, will be on-call and provide a dedicated crisis response capability and "are
designed to meet CINC-identified time-critical mission objectives" (15:2). While the Air
Force has quantified AEF/AEW capabilities, some of these capabilities have yet to be
validated. Although mission capabilities have been validated by past AEFs, the AEW
72-hour response capability has yet to be achieved. The failure of past AEFs to meet this
response capability raises the question: Can it be achieved?

The terms AEF or AEW are used throughout this thesis to represent more than
one meaning. At times these terms represent a force capability; however, in the event
that an AEF/AEW has been deployed the term may represent the resulting deployment.
Each AEF/AEW is comprised of several Unit Type Codes (UTCs). These UTCs
represent specific force packages. The mission capability of each AEF/AEW exists as a
sum of the UTC capabilities. Therefore, in order to quantify the capability of an
AEF/AEW, planners must first identify the UTCs assigned to each AEF/AEW. Next, it
is necessary to determine the capability of each of these UTCs. The mission capabilities
for each UTC are well documented in Mission Capability Statements (MISCAPS). The
validation process for UTC inclusion in the MISCAPS is intense and iterative in nature
(13:17-18). Therefore, the mission capability of an AEF/AEW may be ascertained by
listing the UTCs. Conversely, the time-based capability of the AEW has not undergone
the same validation process as the mission capability for UTCs. The effort to define both
the AEW and AEF in terms of UTCs is an ongoing process.
In September 1998, an announcement by General Ryan implied there would be a
difference between the AEW and the AEF (41). Actually, the AEW differs from the AEF
with regard to the 72-hour response requirement. Additionally, the AEW will eventually
exist as a force module with a standard list of UTCs. This ensures that supported CINCs
know the make-up of the forces they will receive when they request an AEW. Whereas
each of the ten AEFs will be tailorable to the CINCs specific mission requirements, an
AEW will be much more rigid in its make-up. This rigidity reduces uncertainty for AEW
planners and enables the AEW to respond more rapidly to the CINCs requirements (20).

Currently, the Draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for EAF implementation
states that an AEW is able to demonstrate operational affect (i.e., put bombs on target) 48
hours after a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Execute Order, given an assumption
of 24 hours of Strategic Warning. However, a comprehensive review of past AEFs
reveals that this 72-hour response capability has never been met. Determining whether or
not future AEWs will have this capability is the underlying management question this
research seeks to answer (15:2). Interestingly, the justification for using 72 hours versus
another time was not found by this research.

Research Objectives
The purpose of the research effort is to determine the probability that an AEW can
meet the 72-hour criterion. This endeavor may serve as one step in the validation process
for the response capability of an AEW. The research will address four objectives to
address the stated problem. Each objective of must be met before proceeding to the next.
Objective 1. The objective of phase 1 is to develop a timeline of the key events
necessary from Strategic Warning through an actual demonstration of operational affect
for a specific AEW scenario. The major undertaking involved with deploying and
employing an AEF/AEW can be divided into a number of concrete steps or key events.
These include actions the deploying unit must accomplish as well as steps taken by Air
Mobility Command (AMC) in deploying each unit. Steps may include generation of
deploying aircraft, recall of AMC crews, crew rest, personnel preparation, cargo and
passenger loading and unloading, flight times, and regeneration.

This research effort will first seek to determine which key events should be
included in determining the time capability of an AEF. The assumptions for the scenario
under investigation will dictate some of the timeline, however much of the timeline will
be applicable to a generic deployment process.
Objective 2. The objective of phase 2 is to approximate distributions for each of
the key events on the timeline. As mentioned, the current goal, or stated capability of an
AEF, is to deploy and employ at the deployed location in 72 hours. This includes 24
hours of Strategic Warning followed by 48 hours of execution. Frequently, response
capability for deployment packages is determined by simply summing the expected
duration/time required for the completion of each key event. In reality the time necessary
to complete key events exists as an expected value with a variance.
Each of the key events leading up to the employment of an AEF/AEW at a
deployed location should be characterized by its expected duration as well as its variance.
In order to provide the National Command Authority (NCA)/CINCs with the best
possible information, these variances must be accounted for when quantifying the
response capability of an AEW.
Objective 3. The objective of phase 3 is to assess the capability of an AEW to
meet the 72-hour requirement given a set of AEW assumptions and the distributions for
the key event times approximated in phase 2. The methodology for assessing this
capability will be simulation.
Objective 4. The objective of phase 4 is to assess the effects of changing
assumptions developed during research objective 1 on the capability of the AEW to meet
the 72-hour requirement. In order to accomplish this analysis, three assumptions will be

altered. This phase of the study entails altering the maximum-on-ground constraint
assumption, the tanker bridge assumption, and the no-failure assumption.
First, it will be determined whether a change in the working maximum-on-ground
(MOG) airlift capacity constraint will improve the probability that an AEW can meet the
72-hour requirement. The AEW working group at Mountain Home AFB has stated that
an increase in airlift capacity throughput is needed in order to ensure the 72-hour criterion
is met. The throughput capacity is dependent upon the working maximum-on-ground
(MOG) constraint at both the deploying base and the deployed location. The working
MOG is simply the number of AMC airlifters that may be loaded concurrently at an
airfield (13:24; 14:5; 20). The AEW working group is currently developing a concept of
operations based on the assumption that air refueling will be accomplished on all
deploying airlifters (20). Although this assumption is not made in addressing research
objective 3, this research phase attempts to assess the impact of air refueling on the AEW
response capability. Finally, research objective 3 entails developing a simulation model
based on an assumption of perfectly reliable deploying airlifters. This research objective
assesses the impact of limited failure and mean time-to-repair on the responsiveness
capability of the AEW. These three departures from the base model developed to address
research objective 3 are discussed more extensively in Chapter III.

Scope
The deployment process timeline created in phase 1 of the research effort will be
specific to the assumptions of an AEW deployed from Mountain Home AFB. One of
these assumptions is that the package is an Eagle Force package. The Eagle Force
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Package consists of 12 F-15Cs, 12 F-16CJs, 12 F-15Es, 4 B-ls, and 4 KC-135s (19).
Other assumptions concerning the size of the deployment package to be moved in the
first 72 hours as well as the conditions of the scenario are made in Chapter III. These
assumptions will not apply to every deployment. However, many of the key events on
the timeline as well as their distributions should be applicable to a process of quantifying
the reaction time of other AEWs or AEFs. More importantly, this thesis will document a
process for evaluating a response-time capability to be used by deliberate and crisis
action planners.
This research will serve as an example for conducting this evaluation and should
not be used to generalize the responsiveness capabilities of other AEFs/AEWs; however,
Air Force leadership may use the process developed in this research as a framework for
evaluating time-critical reaction capability for future AEW/AEF deployments.

Research Questions
To meet the objectives of this study, the following research questions were
developed:
1. What key events represent the critical path for the first 72 hours of an AEW
deployment timeline?
2. What are the approximated distributions for each of the key events in this deployment
timeline?
3. What is the current probability for completing an AEW in 72 hours?
4. What are the new probabilities for completing an AEW given changes in conceptual
model assumptions to include: throughput capacity (i.e., increase in working
maximum-on-ground), maintenance downtime due to airlift failures, and
accomplishment of air-to-air refueling for all deploying airlifters?

Methodology
The tool used in this research effort is simulation modeling. Simulation modeling
is used due to the complexity inherent to the deployment process. Simulation modeling
allows for accurate modeling of real systems to complex for analytical models, control of
experimental conditions, repeatability, and comparison of alternative system designs
(6:3-7).
The ability of the AEW to meet the 72-hour criterion will be quantified as a
probability using the results of simulation modeling. This ability will be analyzed using
traditional statistical techniques. These techniques will be used for the results of the
simulation model developed to address research questions 3 as well as the results of the
three departures from this model accomplished to address research question 4.

Overview of Remaining Chapters
This research effort begins with an examination of current literature pertinent to
the topic. The literature provides a framework for consultation with experts to help
document the deployment process timeline. The actual literature review and consultation
with experts is used to complete research objectives 1 and 2.
As mentioned, simulation is used in this research effort as a methodology to
generate probability distributions representing the amount of time required for an AEW
to demonstrate operational effect. Statistical analysis is accomplished on the baseline
model to address research question 3. Finally, the baseline simulation model is altered to
evaluate the effects of increased throughput capacity, potential maintenance downtime,
and the air refueling on the probability of adhering to the 72-hour AEW criterion.
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Summary
This chapter described the origination of the AEF/AEW concept as a tool for
forward presence/power projection. In order for the AEF/AEW to assume this role as a
military instrument it must be responsive. Chapter I also discussed the need for
quantifying the responsiveness capability of a rapid-response AEW. Additionally, the
research objectives as well as the research questions necessary to meet those objectives
were formulated.
The remaining chapters will explain the steps taken to address the four research
objectives. In Chapter II, an overview of the planning process, the AEW concept, and a
history of past AEFs are presented. Chapter III provides an explanation of the research
methodology and the assumptions made to meet the objectives of this research. In
Chapter IV, the analysis portion of this research and the results of this analysis are
presented. Finally, Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the research effort, Air Force
implications, and recommendations for future research.
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II. Background

Chapter Overview
This chapter focuses on research objective one of this study. This entails a review
of the literature aimed at describing the AEW concept as well as its place in the joint
planning environment. Also, a personal interview process is used to supplement the
literature review. The major topics of this chapter concentrate on the planning process,
deployment process, past AEFs, and the current EAF concept as it pertains to
deployments in the Southwest Asia area of responsibility.
The EAF concept was developed as a response to changing National Military
Strategy (NMS). An AEF/AEW is best viewed as a capability for meeting the
requirements outlined in the NMS. In order to fully understand the role of the AEF/AEW
as a force capability alternative, a synopsis of the planning process is necessary.
The AEW concept, once fully developed, will be a force option consideration for
decision-makers and members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)
during both deliberate as well as crisis action planning. However, the exact capability of
the AEW/AEF must be quantified so both the JPEC and National Command Authority
(NCA) can compare between force option alternatives. The responsiveness capability of
an AEW/AEF can only be quantified through an analysis of the deployment process. In
order to facilitate this analysis, this chapter defines the deployment process so that a
detailed timeline flowchart can be accomplished. Finally, a thorough description of the
currently evolving AEW/AEF concept for deployment to the Southwest Asia area of
responsibility is provided along with its relationship to the deployment process.
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National Security Strategy
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a biennial product created by the
National Security Council System (NSCS). The National Security Council, comprised of
the President, Vice-President, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and Secretary of State,
develop the National Security Strategy to explain the national security interests and
objectives of the U.S. Furthermore, this document illustrates the intended use of
political, economic, military, and informational power to achieve national objectives
while protecting national security interests. The NSS provides broad direction and
establishes the framework for the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Biennial
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (BPPBS), and the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The current National Security Strategy is
titled A National Security Strategy for a New Century (4:502).
The current National Security Strategy does not specifically mention the AEW;
however, it does make reference to the sixth AEF (also known as the 347 AEW). The
NSS alludes to the AEF/AEW concept by stating, "our forces in the Gulf are backed by
our ability to rapidly reinforce the region in time of crisis, which we demonstrated
convincingly in late 1997 and early 1998" (51:52). This illustrates the significance of the
AEF concept to the national objectives outlined in the NSS.

National Military Strategy
National Military Strategy (NMS) is derived from the National Security Strategy
and is a product of the Joint Strategic Planning System. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) on a biennial basis submits the NMS to the National Security Council
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documenting his recommendations for force structure as well as the intended use of
military assets to ensure that the national objectives described in the NSS are achieved
4:501; 7:4).
The current NMS, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New
Era, details two national military objectives: (1) Promote Peace and Stability and when
necessary (2) Defeat Adversaries. "Although the military by itself can rarely address the
root causes of conflict—as it often stems from political, economic, social, and legal
conditions that are beyond the core competence of the military to resolve," (29) one
method for promoting peace and stability, according to the current NMS, is through the
use of peacetime deterrence. National Military Strategy states, "deterrence means
preventing potential adversaries from taking aggressive actions that threaten our interests,
allies, partners, or friends" (29). The NMS declares that one element used to accomplish
deterrence is through, "our capability to rapidly project and concentrate military power
worldwide" (29). This "ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain US forces"
(29) is a strategic concept defined within the NMS and termed power projection. One
means for achieving power projection is through the use of a flexible deterrent option
(FDO). The flexible deterrent option concept will be discussed later in the Crisis Action
Planning section of this chapter.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of staff depends upon products generated by the Joint
Strategic Planning System, Biennial Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System in order to develop his National Military
Strategy. These systems are interrelated, and products of each system are integral to the
functions within the other systems. The products of the Joint Strategic Planning System
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include: the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the
Joint Planning Document (JPD), the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), and the
NMS as already described (4:502).

Joint Strategic Planning System
The products of the JSPS are briefly described in the following paragraphs.
Joint Strategy Review. The JSR represents a continuous process of monitoring
the international environment for issues, threats, or factors that may have impact on the
NMS. The JSR consists of three products used to update NMS: JSR issue papers, JSR
long-range vision paper, and the JSR annual report (4:502; 7:3-4).
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides guidance to the unified
commands as well as the military services. It is the single source document to direct the
unified CINCs to perform strategic planning. Therefore, the JSCP serves as the catalyst
to begin deliberate planning which will be explained later in this chapter. Additionally,
the JSCP apportions forces to the CINCs and assigns tasks and missions congruent with
NMS (4:502).
Joint Planning Document. The JPD is a stand-alone document used as an input to
the BPPBS. The JPD is sent to the SecDef for consideration during his preparation of the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The JPD contains the CJCS's priorities for programs
and requirements considered during the evolution of the BPPBS to include acquisition
(4:502; 7:6).
Chairman's Program Assessment. The CPA is the CJCS assessment of the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) towards the end of the PPBS process. The
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CPA includes the Chairman's recommendation for adjustments to any of the Service
POMs. The CPA is given to the SecDef for consideration before the Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) (4:502; 7:5).

Biennial Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
The BPPBS is the DoD process to establish, maintain, and revise the Future Years
Defense Plan (FYDP), as well as the DoD portion of the President's Budget. The
Secretary of Defense is responsible for oversight of this system. The BPPBS, combined
with the Joint Strategic Planning System, seeks to provide the unified CINCs with the
optimum mixture of missions, forces, equipment, and support in keeping with NMS
(4:502; 7:7-9).

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
Essentially, JOPES exists as the combination of a single set of automated data
processing procedures and the networked computer hardware and software necessary for
the planning and execution of all military operations. JOPES ensures that all users
throughout the DoD use the same vocabulary and procedures in training, planning, and
actual execution of military operations. JOPES is used as the command and control
system to effectively and efficiently manage resources during both deliberate and crisis
action planning. JOPES allows the Joint Planning and Execution Community to plan and
direct the use of resources. In this case, resources are accounted for in the JOPES
database as a shopping list of forces to include personnel and equipment (27; 28:26).
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Personnel and equipment are grouped into force packages, which provide specific
wartime capabilities. These force packages are designated by a five-character
alphanumeric code known as a Unit Type Code (UTC). For instance, the UTC 3FQDF
represents the personnel, aircraft, and equipment required to employ and support 18 F15Cs. This particular UTC consists of over 300 personnel and 300 short tons of cargo.
This UTC is directly related to combat and does not contain base operating support
(BOS) resources. In order to deploy this UTC to a bare-base environment, additional
UTCs that provide combat support and combat service support capabilities would also
need to be tasked (25:1-7).
Currently, an AEF/AEW exists in the JOPES database as a collection of many
individual UTCs. Air Force planners are presently endeavoring to create a force module
for the AEW. A force module is a linking of UTCs within the JOPES database to
enhance the usability of the JOPES by allowing deliberate or crisis action planners to
easily fill capability requirements with appropriate force modules. A force module is then
a group of UTCs within the JOPES database, which in the aggregate represent a specific
capability (21; 25).
Collectively, the preceding discussion of National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, Joint Strategic Planning System, Biennial Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System, and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System provide the
necessary background for a description of the deliberate and crisis action planning
processes.
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Deliberate Planning
As stated, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan initiates deliberate planning. Each
of the services, after receiving the JSCP, translates this joint document into service
unique planning guidance and requirements. The Air Force version of this translation is
known as the War and Mobilization Plan (WMP). Deliberate planning is accomplished
through JOPES, which acts as a framework for all joint planning. Deliberate planning is
a peacetime process of translating national objectives into military capabilities, and it
exists as a "planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces
and resources that occur in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely
heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is
executed" (27). The deliberate planning process consists of five phases: (1) Initiation;
(2) Concept Development; (3) Plan Development; (4) Plan Review; and (5) Supporting
Plans (4:602).

The objective of deliberate planning is to develop operational plans

(OPLANs), concept plans (CONPLANs), supporting plans, and functional plans. A brief
overview of the events within each phase is included in Figure 1.
The OPLANS that result from deliberate planning are represented within the
JOPES database as Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TPFDD
contains information regarding the units to be deployed, the routing of forces, movement
requirements, and the time-phasing of these movements required to support the OPLAN
(18:48).
Currently, AEWs are not part of the deliberate planning process. The AEW
concept only exists in the disaggregate. In other words, a supported CINC would need to
request each of the UTCs that comprise an AEW in order to receive all of the forces and
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— The Deliberate Planning Process
PHASE I INITIATION
CINC receives planning task and guidance from CJCS
Major forces and strategic lift assets available for
planning are apportioned
PHASE II CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
Mission statement is deduced
Subordinate tasks are derived
Alternative courses of action are analyzed
Concept of operations is developed and documented
THE PRODU C T: CINC'S S TRA TEGIC C ONC EP T
PHASE III PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Forces are selected and time-phased
Support requirements are computed
Strategic deployment is simulated
Shortfalls are identified and resolved
Operation Plan is documented
^jQPLAl
THE PRODUCT: A COMPLETED PLAN
PHASE IV PLAN REVIEW
Operation Plan is reviewed and approved by CJCS
CINC revises plan lAdV review comments
THE PRODUCT: AN APPROVED PLAN
SlittpOrtinfc
PHASE V SUPPORTING PLANS
jpians
Supporting plans are completed, documented.
and validated
THE PRODUCT: A FAMILY OF PLANS

Figure 1. Deliberate Planning Process (4:6-10)

equipment necessary to employing/deploying an AEW. In order to expedite this process.
Colonel Gail Duke, Commander, 366th Logistics Group, is one of the lead Air Force
planners currently working to create a rapid-response AEW force module (20).
Notwithstanding the amount of effort that is expended in deliberate planning, no
plan is perfect. Furthermore, a crisis involving a threat or potential threat to U.S. national
interests could occur at any time for which there is no existing plan. In either case, the
JPEC engages in a process known as crisis action planning.

19

Crisis Action Planning
Crisis action planning (CAP) is the accomplishment of time-sensitive joint
planning to meet national objectives. CAP is also achieved through the utilization of the
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.
While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are
always situations arising in the present that might require U.S. military response.
Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate
planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will
be completely unanticipated. Usually, the time available to plan responses to such
real-time events is short (4:700).
The CAP process consists of six phases. Each phase and its associated action is shown in
Table 1.

Table 1. Crisis Action Planning Phases (4:701)
Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

Phase IV

Phase V

Phase VI

Situation
Development
Event occurs
with possible
national
security
implications

Crisis
Assessment
CINC'S
REPORT/
ASSESSMENT
received

COA
Development
CJCS sends
WARNING
ORDER

COA
Selection
CJCS
presents
refined and
prioritized
COAs to
NCA

Execution
Planning
CINC
receives
ALERT
ORDER or
PLANNING
ORDER

Execution
NCA decides
to execute
OPORD

Phase I (Situation Development). Many U.S. organizations throughout the world
continuously engage in situation monitoring. When an event occurs that is assessed by
the monitoring agency as out of the ordinary, or if said event could possibly have an
adverse affect on U.S. national interests, then organizations are required to report the
event. The focal point for these reports is the National Military Command Center
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(NMCC). The CINC is also required to give an assessment with justification that the
situation demands higher-echelon awareness. This assessment officially ends Phase I
(4:702).
It is important to note in some situations that due to time criticality a rapid
response may be required. In such a case, a theatre CINC assessment may also contain a
recommended course of action (COA) and the phases of CAP could be compressed or
skipped altogether. One of these rapid responses may be the use of power projection. As
mentioned in Chapter I, a flexible deterrent option (FDO) is a method for accomplishing
power projection and thereby achieving deterrence. By definition a flexible deterrent
option is:
A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide
range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options
carefully tailored to send the right signal. The Flexible Deterrent Option is the
means by which the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as
economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures) are implemented into the
planning process. (27)
The act of ordering a carrier battle group to begin travel to an indicated AOR is one
example of a FDO (5). In the very near future, AEWs and "AEFs will be called upon as
a FDO, often heading off the need for further engagement by virtue of their early onscene arrival" (40).
Phase II (Crisis Assessment). The focus of this particular phase is on the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the National Command Authority.
The CJCS may choose to remain in this phase, return to Phase I, or progress to the next
phase of crisis action planning. During this phase the CJCS may decide to increase
military readiness. This may be accomplished through use of a Deployment Preparation
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Order or a Deployment Order. Specific instructions to various supporting CINCs would
accompany these orders. This phase is concluded when the NCA makes the decision to
have military options developed for consideration (4:702).
Phase HI (COA Development! Based on the NCA's decision to enter Phase III,
the CJCS will publish a Warning Order (see Appendix B). The Warning Order directs
the pertinent CINC to begin developing COAs. The supported CINC, in turn, sends
potential supporting commanders an Evaluation Response Message requesting the
identification of forces and resources that may be made available for planning purposes.
The supported CINC and his staff first review existing Operation Plans for applicability
to the crisis at hand. Next, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is used to
actually develop possible COAs (4:702).
This planning process is not accomplished in a vacuum. The CINCs staff
communicates with the various supporting commands to ensure course of action
feasibility. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is integral to this process.
Planners at USTRANSCOM prepare deployment estimates for the supported CINC, help
to refine timing, and validate the transportation feasibility of each COA. This phase
concludes with the submission of the CINCs Commander's Estimate to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commander's Estimate will include the COAs developed
during this phase as well as the CINCs recommendation for a particular COA (4:702).
Phase IV TCOA Selection!. At this point the focus returns to the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authority. The CJCS fulfills his role in this
phase by giving his own recommendation to the NCA, and providing advice as needed.
The CJCS may decide to issue a Planning Order before actual selection of a COA. The
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Planning Order is designed to expedite execution planning. Upon selection of a specific
course of action by the National Command Authority, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
issues an Alert Order. The Alert Order concludes Phase IV and begins execution
planning (4:702).
Phase V (Execution Planning). The CINC translates the selected COA into an
Operation Order (OPORD) during this phase. Also during this phase, detailed movement
requirements are identified and scheduled, shortfalls and limitations are resolved,
sustainment requirements are developed, and initial deploying forces are identified. The
JOPES system is used extensively throughout this phase. This phase is concluded with a
National Command Authority decision to execute the OPORD developed by the
supported CINC (4:702).
Phase VI (Execution). After the NCA decision, the CJCS publishes an Execute
Order by direction and authority of Secretary of Defense. USTRANSCOM is responsible
for using its resources to comply with the movement requirements detailed in the
Operation Order. The supporting CINCs furnish forces and resources to the supported
CINC in accordance with the OPORD. Finally, the supported CINC monitors the
execution of the OPORD through JOPES, and the CINC continues execution of the
OPORD until the crisis is resolved or the operation is cancelled (4:702).
The preceding paragraphs described the deliberate and crisis action planning
process. The description of these processes provides a framework for discussing the
AEW deployment concept.
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AEW Deployment Concept
As mentioned in Chapter I, General Michael E. Ryan recently announced plans to
redesign the Air Force into an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). General Ryan's
plan calls for ten AEFs and two on-call AEWs to be created by 1 January 2000 (22).
This recent announcement lends credibility to the AEF concept; however, many
challenges lay ahead for the Air Force in refining the AEF concept. First, the Air Force
will need to provide the National Command Authority with accurate information
regarding capabilities and costs of AEF/AEW deployments. In order to provide this
information, the Air Force must first define the terms AEF and AEW. Furthermore,
accomplishing General Ryan's vision of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force in the 21st
Century will require continuous improvements in the efficient use of limited resources
such as airlift, manpower, and equipment.
Prior to General Ryan's announcement, the terms AEW and AEF were used
interchangeably; however, many steps are ongoing to define the AEW and the AEF.
Although the development of AEF/AEW concept of operations is an ongoing effort,
many of the aspects are widely accepted by the Air Force planning community. It is
important to note at this point that assertions made in this study represent a snapshot in
time, and current AEF/AEW concepts are certainly subject to change as the EAF evolves
and refines the AEF and AEW.
The current intention of Air Force planners is to standardize the AEW package in
order to reduce uncertainty for AEW personnel. In contrast, AEF packages may be
tailored according to CINC requirements "such as command and control, jamming,
electronic intelligence, signals intelligence interception, combat search and rescue, and
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air refueling" (31:6). A standardized AEW package will enable planners to accomplish
detailed planning, thus increasing their capability to rapidly respond.
Another difference between the developing AEW and AEF concepts is based on
the idea of the lead unit. During past AEF deployments a lead unit has been designated
from the three CONUS based units deploying to form the AEF (31:8). The lead unit is
responsible for bringing all base operating support forces required at the deployed
location. These housekeeping capabilities would typically consist of the people and
equipment necessary to perform operations such as security, civil engineering, fire
protection, communication, food services, medical, and intelligence. Additionally, the
lead unit is responsible for maintaining corporate knowledge gained by deploying to each
specific location (31:8-9). In contrast to this concept, the on-call AEW at Mountain
Home AFB provides all of the base operating support (except force protection) as well as
the fighters, bombers, and tankers (20). Therefore it is conceivable and even likely that
the forces and weapons systems comprising future AEWs and AEFs may be very similar.
The only difference is the method in which they are sourced. AEFs are a mixture of
forces from different bases, while the Mountain Home AEW deploys almost entirely
from Mountain Home AFB. Recall from Chapter I that the on-call AEW at Mountain
Home AFB is the subject of this study.
Although the AEF/AEW Concept of Operations is currently under development,
there are several concepts likely to be incorporated based on the evolution of the AEF
concept in the last five years. One accepted concept entails deploying AEF/AEWs to
previously visited foreign airfields. Furthermore, each of these airfields is equipped with
a variety of prepositioned assets such as: vehicles, tents, meals ready-to-eat (MREs), and
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supplies. These prepositioned assets, also known as War Reserve Materiel (WRM) are
stored in large metal buildings, called K-SPANs (30:4-9). A concept not yet validated by
past AEFs would have a force deploying as an additive force during times of crisis by
emptying K-SPANS to use necessary WRM, using the K-SPANS as temporary lodging,
and eating MREs until such time as hostilities subside and a tent city can be erected
(30:4-9). The lessons learned from the completion of seven AEF deployments to three
countries within the Middle East are currently being used to establish AEF/AEW
CONOPS and planning assumptions. A detailed overview of these past AEFs is included
later in this chapter.
The political benefits of AEF deployments to these countries during peacetime
have already been realized to some extent. Deployed AEF forces work closely with
military members of the host country. This has resulted in a fostering of goodwill and
enhanced communications between the U.S. and the political leadership in Jordan,
Bahrain, and Qatar, all AEF locations. This benefit has opened the door to overcoming
the constraint of diplomatic clearances (discussed in Chapter III). Additionally, the
USAF has begun to realize the benefit of drawing down some of the forces permanently
deployed to the Southwest Asia area of responsibility, as the AEF concept becomes more
credible. This is one method to decrease the high operations tempo problem present in
today's Air Force (30:4-9).
As discussed previously, the mission of the AEW is aligned with the Air Force's
mission to develop options for power projection and forward presence FDOs. The
AEF/AEW mission is twofold, consisting of both political and military components.
Politically, the AEW/AEF offers the NCA an additional option in accomplishing power
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projection and forward presence. Militarily, the AEW serves the mission requirements of
the various regional CINCs. An AEW may be deployed to act as a rapid, responsive, and
reliable additive force in the event of imminent hostilities or as a filler force in scenarios
such as a carrier gap (30:6). Although AEFs have been accomplished in Pacific and
European AORs, this study focuses on a single area of responsibility for the sake of
simplicity.
The package size and make-up of an AEF/AEW are related to the responsiveness
and lethality/capability, respectively, of the force. Although a CINCs requirement for
response time and lethality are likely to vary according to situation, a standard package is
used for the AEW. Although the AEW is a work in progress, one current standard,
known as the Eagle Force Module, consists of 12 air superiority fighters (F-15Cs), 12
strike aircraft (F-15Es), 12 Suppresion of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) aircraft (F-16CJs),
4 long-range bombers (B-ls), 4 air-to-air refeulers (KC-135s or KC-10s), and Army air
defense artillery capability (Patriot missiles). This research effort will use this package
for analysis in later chapters (2; 19).
Although many Air Force planners are now contributing to the development of
AEF/AEW CONOPS, the seven AEFs completed in the last five years may be the best
sources of information in assessing the response capability of future AEF/AEW
deployments. For this reason it is necessary to discuss each of the seven AEFs. An
overview of these AEFs is included in Tables 2 and 3. A complete discussion of each
AEF follows.
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Table 2. AEF Deployments to USCENTCOM (11:2-20)

Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Dates
30 Oct 95 -18 Dec 95
12 Apr 96-26 Jun 96
2 Jul 96 - 21 Aug 96
19 Feb 97-21 Jun 97
19 Sep-21 Oct 97
22 Nov 97 - Apr 98
Mar 98-Jun 98

Location
Shaikh Isa, Bahrain
Azraq, Jordan
Doha, Qatar
Doha, Qatar
Shaikh Isa, Bahrain
Shaikh Isa, Bahrain
Shaikh Isa, Bahrain

Designation
AEF I
AEF II
AEF III
4 AEW
366 AEW
347 AEW
366 AEW

Table 3. AEF Packages (11:2-20; 37)

AEFim

4 AEW m

12F-16CG 347 WG
6F-16C2 20 FW

Moody AFB
Shaw AFB

AEF II (2)
12F-15C
12F-16CG
6F-16CJ
4KC-135R

1FW
347 WG
366 WG
97ARW

Langley AFB
Moody AFB
Mountain Home AFB
Fairchild AFB

AEF III (3)
12 F-15 E 4 FW
12F-15C 33 FW
6F-16CJ 20 FW
4 KC-135R 319 ARW
2 B-52G 2 BW

Seymour Johnson AFB
Eglin AFB
Shaw AFB
Grand Forks AFB
Barksdale AFB

366 AEW (7)
12F-15C 366 WG
12F-15E 366 WG
12F-16CJ 366 WG
2B-1
366 WG
4KC-135R366WG
Patriot Batt. 11 ADA

Mountain Home AFB
Mountain Home AFB
Mountain Home AFB
Mountain Home AFB
Mountain Home AFB
Fort Bliss

12F-15E
12F-16C
12F-16C
12F-16CJ

4FW
27 FW
169FG
20 FW

Seymour Johnson AFB
Cannon AFB
McEntire ANGB
Shaw AFB

366 AEW (5)
6 F-15C
6 F-15E
10 F-16CJ
2KC-135R
2 B-l
Patriot Batt.

3 66 WG Mountain Home AFB
366 WG Mountain Home AFB
366 WG Mountain Home AFB
366 WG Mountain Home AFB
366 WG Mountain Home AFB
11 ADA Fort Bliss

347 AEW (6)
12F-15C 33 FW
12F-16C 347 WG
6F-16CJ 20 FW
2 B-l
28 BW
4KC-135R97ARW
Patriot Batt. 3 ADA
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Eglin AFB
Moody AFB
Shaw AFB
Ellsworth AFB
Fairchild AFB
Fort Bliss

Overview of Past AEF Deployments
Although each of the AEFs differ in a number of different areas, generally
accepted standards have emerged with regard to the AEF concept. The lessons learned
from past AEFs have allowed planners to develop assumptions, identify constraints, and
improve concept of operations for the future use of AEF/AEWs. As previously
mentioned, this research is concerned with determining whether the responsiveness
capability of the AEW to the Southwest Asia area of responsibility will meet the 72-hour
criterion, set by senior Air Force leadership. Therefore, discussion of past AEFs will
focus on the characteristics of each AEF affecting the ability of the AEF to plan, deploy,
and employ strike package assets within the 72-hour criterion. Although none of the
AEFs complied with the 72-hour requirement as it is described in this research effort, a
discussion of the characteristics of each AEF will provide justification for the
assumptions used in Chapter III.
The characteristics of each AEF are described in the following sections based on
several sources. Several of the AEFs are well-documented in previous thesis efforts,
journal entries, after action reports, and assorted newspapers. Unfortunately, the
characteristics that affected the ability of the AEF to plan, deploy, and employ were not
entirely available through these sources. In order to describe the events that occurred, in
many instances, personnel were contacted from the pertinent organizations.
The characteristics of each deployment may be categorized as plan, deployment,
or employment characteristics. The plan characteristic for each AEF includes: timing
associated with issuance of Warning Order/beginning of Strategic Warning, the aircraft
package size/mix, the receipt time of Execute Order, and the size of the deployment
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package required to be at the deployed location prior to the arrival of the aircraft package.
The timing associated with Strategic warning and the Execute Order determine whether
or not the stringent 24 hours of Strategic warning followed by an Execute Order are met.
The AEF must then have the capability to put bombs on target 48 hours after the Execute
Order. The aircraft package has an effect on the size of the deployment package required
to be at the deployed location prior to the arrival of the aircraft package. This package
may include base operating support as well as the personnel and equipment required to
actually regenerate the strike package (2:8; 22).
Deployment characteristics include details about the tanker bridge, airlift
information, and enroute stops. The tanker bridge refers to the capability for AMC to
provide tanker support to deploying aircraft as well as airlifters laden with deploying
personnel and cargo. The discussion of each AEF contains information regarding the
number, type, and timing of the airlifters used to deploy. Finally, the use of enroute stops
for airlifters is discussed due to the effect this may have on overall timing (32).
Employment refers to the characteristics of the deploying aircraft. For most of the
AEFs, the strike aircraft actually met the 48-hour criterion following the Execute Order
even though the 72-hour requirement was not met. The number of aircraft regenerated to
actually fly to a target has evolved. Currently, the planning assumption used for the
AEW is 4X4X4 or 4 F-15Cs, 4 F-15Es, and 4 F-16CJs (19).
The following sections will provide an overview of each of the seven AEFs to the
Southwest Asia area of responsibility. The AEW concept is used as frame of reference
for this discussion. The assumptions and requirements for the AEW, as used in this
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research effort, will be alluded to by this discussion. Once again, these assumptions will
be enumerated in Chapter III.
AEFI. The first actual AEF deployment occurred in October 1995. The
deploying units for this AEF were the 347 Fighter Wing, Moody AFB, GA and the 20
Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, SC. These bases deployed 12 F-16CGs and six F-16CJs
respectively to Shaikh Isa, Bahrain. F-16CJs were used to fulfill the SEAD role due to
their High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) Targeting System (HTS) capability.
AMC moved approximately 318 short-tons of cargo and deployed 431 personnel (33;
47:49-50).
Although valuable lessons were gleaned from this first AEF it did not serve as
validation for the no-notice rapid reaction 72-hour criterion for several reasons. First,
AEF I wing-level planning began several weeks before actual execution. Wing personnel
were aware of the deployment location as well as approximate timing. This information
is essential for the completion of many deployment actions, but may not be available for
future deployments when the stringent no-notice AEW deployment CONOPS are
applied. The AEF I deployment package was considerably smaller than the AEW
concept of today. The entire deployment package of AEF I is less than the amount of
cargo and personnel required to be in place at the deployed location before the fighters
arrive at the deployed location in the current AEF concept of operations (47:49).
Execute Order for AEF I was given 20 October, 1995. Deployment operations
continued until 28 October. Although this timeline falls far short of today's response
criterion, AEF I proved to Air Force leadership that a rapid response capability was
viable (47:59).
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AEFII. The AEFII deployment was a significant increase in firepower when
compared to the first AEF. AEF II was a 30-ship fighter package consisting of 12 F15C's from the 1 FW, Langley AFB, VA; 12 F-16CGs from 347 FW, Moody AFB, GA;
and six F-16C/Js from the 366 Composite Wing at Mountain Home AFB, ID. In
addition, 4 KC-135s were deployed from 97 ARS, Fairchild AFB, WA. The 1 FW was
lead unit for this deployment. AEF II was deployed in April 1996 to Azraq Air Base,
Jordan. Forces were redeployed to CONUS in June of 1996. AEF II involved the
deployment of over 1300 personnel and 1000 short-tons of cargo (3; 47:51-53).
This was not a short-notice tasking for the bases deploying forces for AEF II. The
bases involved with this AEF had several weeks to plan and coordinate the deployment;
however, AEF II was the first step in establishing the 72-hour criterion. Many associated
with this deployment, including Brigadier General Looney, claimed that operational
effect was established within 48 hours of the Execute Order (31:8). In fact, this was the
claim of several AEFs accomplished thus far. The disconnect has been in counting only
the fighter timeline while ignoring the timeline for deployment of support personnel and
cargo (47:59-60). In the case of AEF II actual deployment operations were commenced
several days before the Execute Order was given. Langley AFB had actually deployed
several airlifters full of deploying cargo and personnel before the arbitrary issuance of a
pre-planned Execute Order.
The two-fold objective of AEF II was met despite the failure to comply with
today's 72-hour criterion. First, AEF II proved that the fighters could indeed meet a 48hour timeline for operational affect after execution. Secondly, Langley AFB deployed
support infrastructure equipment that was placed into storage after the AEF for use in
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future Southwest Asia deployments. This requirement for the deployment of
infrastructure assets contributed to making AEFII the largest AEF in terms of movement
requirements to date. AEF II required a total of 88 C-141 equivalents whereas the next
largest deployment, AEF III, required 44 C-141 equivalents. Although AEF II did not
validate the concept of a no-notice, rapid-response force capable of meeting the 72-hour
criterion it was the next logical step on the path towards validation of the AEF concept
(3; 47:51-53).
Shortly after the return of AEF II, Langley AFB submitted a 65-page consolidated
lessons learned report that is still used by AEF/AEW planners today. One comment was
that "with only 6 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) aircraft and 10 pilots, the
current AEF composition is inadequate. Consequently, the overall mission capability
was diminished, and in some cases denied" (1). As a result successive AEF planning has
evolved to the deployment of 36 fighter aircraft versus 30. Many of the assumptions and
planning factors developed for the second AEF are still in affect for AEF/AEW planning
today (20).
Another concept advanced during AEF II revolved around the importance of
prioritizing the first several chalks of cargo and personnel required to arrive before the
combat jets. A chalk represents one deploying airlifter. Planners involved in this AEF
were informed that airlift scheduled to arrive before the combat jets must contain all
cargo and personnel necessary to conduct operations for the first seven days. This was
significant because most Unit Type Codes (UTCs) are built for thirty days of operations
without sustainment. This concept resulted in a 7/23-day split of tasked UTCs, whereby
cargo and personnel were prioritized on a micro-level so that all of those capabilities

33

deemed necessary for the first seven days were deployed according to order of
importance. Langley termed this list of equipment and personnel the Initial Strike
Package Airlift (ISPA) (3; 10). Currently, the term Initial Combat Capability (ICC) is
used by AEF planners to refer to this list of equipment and personnel.
The prioritization of equipment and cargo was necessary due to the limitations of
the TPFDD. Although the purpose of a TPFDD is to communicate the time-phasing of
forces into a theatre of operations this is only accomplished on a macro-level. The
TPFDD assigns Required Delivery Dates (RDD) for specific UTCs. For example, a
TPFDD may task the wing to send a 12-ship aviation package, an accompanying
munitions UTC, and several support UTCs. However, all of these UTCs may have the
same RDD of C-Day + 5 (see Appendix B), whereas the first airlifter arrives at the base
at C-Day + 1. Additionally, any one UTC may entail several hundred tons of cargo and
just as many people, or a UTC could consist of one person. The task of prioritizing the
cargo and personnel within these UTCs is given to the Installation Deployment Officer
(IDO), for the deploying base. The IDO is responsible for overseeing all base
deployment planning and execution.
Immediately following AEF II, the 1 FW organized an Initial Strike Package
Airlift (ISPA) working group tasked with determining the requirements for the first seven
days as well as the priority for those requirements. The working group completed this
task for three different AEF scenarios.
1. lead unit, bare base
2. lead unit, main operating base
3. supporting unit, bare base or main operating base (10; 47:51)
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A meeting between AMC and ACC planners resulted in a handshake agreement that the
lead unit for an AEF deployment to a bare base would get two C-5s and two C-141s
worth of airlift for ISPA. The dependent/supporting unit would receive one C-5 and one
C-141 as their airlift for the ISPA. For the first scenario, the Langley working group
surmised that 40 UTCs should be tasked. The second scenario consisted of 35 UTCs, and
the third package was the smallest with 15 UTCs. The working group was able to build
and prioritize an initial strike package that met the airlift constraint for all three scenarios
(10).
General Looney's article, derived from his AEF II experience, The Air
Expeditionary Force, is considered by some to be the definitive work in explaining the
role, assumptions, and implementation process for an AEF (10). General Looney
enumerated planning assumptions such as diplomatic clearances, overfly rights, hostnation base requirements, airlift requirements, and munitions constraints that must be
reconciled (31:7-8). These assumptions are discussed further in Chapter III.
AEF HI and AEF IV. AEFs III and IV may be grouped because the 4 FW at
Seymour Johnson AFB, NC was the lead unit for both of these AEFs. Additionally, both
of these deployments were to Doha, Qatar. In both cases Seymour Johnson sent 12 F15Es. In AEF III the 33 FW, Eglin AFB sent 12 F-15Cs, and the 20 FW, Shaw AFB sent
six F-15CJs. In addition, two B-52s were also deployed from the 2 BW at Barksdale
AFB, LA. The AEF III deployment was conducted as a phased deployment not meant to
validate the 72-hour requirement (8). Furthermore, AEF III participants started planning
90 days prior to the deployment. AEF III was handled as a rotational deployment to the
AOR. The AEF III package was meant to be a replacement of forces in theatre for the
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redeploying AEFII. The entire package for AEF III required approximately 44 C-141
equivalents to move and the deployed force was just short of 1100 personnel (33; 47:5457).
The redeployment of AEF II fighters occurred as scheduled on 27 June 1996, just
two days after the Khobar Towers bombing. AEF III fighters were deployed to the AOR
during the first week of July, 1996. According to one source, the philosophy at the time
was that each AEF would be deployed to one of five different locations (10). AEF I to
Bahrain, AEF II to Jordan, and now AEF III and IV to Qatar. The other two locations
have not hosted AEFs, to date. These locations were within the United Arab Emirates
and Kuwait. The prevailing concept was that each AEF would be responsible for
deploying with materials necessary to build up the infrastructure at each of the five
locations. Upon termination of each AEF the infrastructure items would be stored in KSPANS until another AEF was deployed to the same location (31:8-9). Additionally, the
AEFs served as diplomatic envoys because the interactions between deployed USAF
members and host nation personnel "were instrumental in increasing cooperation,
understanding, and mutual admiration between our countries and our air forces" (31:9).
This type of success would hopefully pave the way for obtaining diplomatic clearances
quickly during future rapid AEF deployments in response to crisis in the region.
AEF III was deployed for six weeks versus the three-month AEF II deployment to
Jordan. This was a return to the original AEF concept of deploying a force for 30-45
days. The shorter time-span eliminated many of the problems that arose due to
sustainment operations; however, AEF IV was definitely a departure from this concept
(8).
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Due to political tensions with Iraq, AEF IV was deployed for four months.
Beginning with the fourth AEF, the AEFs were no longer numbered sequentially. AEF
IV was known as the 4 AEW, because the 4 FW was once again the lead unit to Doha,
Qatar. The aircraft and locations of their participants in this deployment included: 12 F16Cs from the 169 Fighter Group (FG) at McEntire ANGB and 12 F16CJs from the 20
FW at Shaw AFB, SC. This marked the first participation of a Guard or Reserve unit in
an AEF deployment. The McEntire F-16s were replaced 45 days into the deployment by
12 F-16Cs from the 27 FW at Cannon AFB, NM. This AEF came closer to meeting the
timing criterion than any other AEF (47:54-57).
The 4 FW had the benefit of already being deployed to Doha during AEF III.
Planning for the 4 AEW deployment was accomplished by personnel who had actually
deployed on AEF III. The deployment of the 4 AEW came just 7 months after the
redeployment of AEF III. Many of the same host nation contractors would be used again
during the 4 AEW deployment. In many ways, AEF III was used as a preparation for the
4 AEW. The deployment of the 4 AEW was supposed to be a good test to validate the
timing criterion future AEWs would need to meet in response to crisis within the AOR.
Seymour-Johnson in conjunction with AMC planners, had created a detailed plan to
ensure the first few chalks would be expedited. This plan was known as the Mulvey plan
(8; 32; 47:54-57).
Seymour-Johnson AFB's equivalent to the ISPA created by Langley is known as
the Initial Combat Capability (ICC). Although Seymour-Johnson did not meet the
criterion of generating sorties within 48 hours of the Execute Order they did come the
closest of the AEF deployments. Seymour Johnson was able to generate sorties 72 hours
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after the Execute Order was given. Prior to the Execute Order the 4 FW, 169 FG, and 20
FW had been in a state of Strategic Warning for 24 hours. However, the deployment
timeline for the 4 AEW was artificial for two reasons. First, as stated, the 4 AEW was a
scheduled deployment and wing personnel were aware of both the deployment location as
well as the schedule for airlift. This information would not be available beforehand in a
no-notice deployment. Second, the first airlifter arrived at L-hour (see Appendix B). In
short, this means that there was a C-5 on the ground at Seymour Johnson at hour zero of
the arbitrarily established Strategic Warning. According to AMC sources, this is not a
realistic assumption for a no-notice AEW deployment (32).
AEFV. AEF V, or the 366 AEW, was the first AEF exclusively accomplished by
one Air Force Base. The 366 WG at Mountain Home AFB deployed six F-15Cs, six F15Es, ten F-16CJs, two KC-135Rs, and two B-ls. This was also the first AEW to include
US Army assets in the deployment. The 11 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) from Fort Bliss,
TX deployed a patriot missile battalion in support of the 366 AEW. The 366 AEW
deployed to the same location as AEF I, Shaikh Isa, Bahrain. The ADA offered a force
protection element to the deployed AEW that had not been present in previous AEFs.
The deployed personnel for the 366 AEW numbered just over 1000 members (3; 11:220).
The 366 AEW was also a scheduled deployment. Personnel from the 366 WG
were involved in numerous planning conferences before the actual deployment, and were
given more than 30 days notification of the timing as well as the location of the
deployment. The 366 AEW was used as both a Phase I and Phase II Operational
Readiness Inspection. ACC/IG inspectors graded the deployment and generation phase
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of this AEW. Additionally, ACC/IG inspectors were actually deployed to Bahrain to
evaluate a Phase II scenario at the deployed location. According to one source, there was
a full two-week delay between the departure of the first airlift aircraft and the arrival of
the fighter package in theatre. This delay allowed virtually all cargo and personnel to be
in place prior to the arrival of the fighters, rather than just the ICC (37).
The airlifters did not fly directly to Bahrain. Instead, all AMC aircraft made an
enroute stop at Moron AB Spain. The 366 AEW fighters were deployed for
approximately one month. This was a return to the original AEF CONOPS for deploying
a force and redeploying before sustainment operations began at the 30-day point. The
fighter package arrived in theatre on or about 15 September. The fighter arrival was
followed by the arrival of the tankers and bombers within 3-5 days. The patriot battalion
was the last force capability to meet closure (20; 37).
AEF VI. The sixth AEF was designated the 347 AEW. The 347 FW from
Moody AFB was the lead unit for this AEF deployment to Bahrain. The 347 FW
deployed 12 F-16Cs; the 33 FW at Eglin AFB, FL deployed 12 F-15Cs; and the 20 FW,
Shaw AFB, SC deployed six F-16CJs. A patriot battalion was again deployed for this
AEW. The deployment also included two B-ls and four KC-135s. The deployment of a
bomber and tanker package, used in this AEW as well as both 366 AEWs, has become
the new standard in deploying a cross-section of operational fire-power. This AEF/AEW,
compared to each of the other AEFs, was the best validation of a no-notice scenario (3;
36).
The 347 AEW was deployed as a military response to Iraqi non-compliance with
United Nations inspectors (30). The elapsed time between the Strategic Warning Order
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and the Execute Order was 24 hours. During this time period, five C-5s landed at Moody
AFB. The first C-5 was launched almost immediately following reception of the Execute
Order. Moody completed its deployment of the ICC with the addition of one more C-5
for a total of six and one C-141. One of the Moody C-5s was forced to divert enroute to
Bahrain due to mechanical problems. This C-5, full of ICC personnel and cargo, did not
arrive before the fighter package (36).
The fighter aircraft deployed from Moody AFB were able to make the 48-hour
criterion, however the tanker bridge was insufficient for Shaw's F-16CJs. The lack of
tanker support forced Shaw F-16s to make an enroute stop at Lajes, Azores (30). The
lack of a tanker bridge also caused delays in airlift. The final result was that the fighter
package arrived at the deployed location piecemeal. In addition, the ICC was not
completely in place before the fighters arrived (20).
AEF VII. The seventh USCENTAF AEF was the last accomplished prior to the
publication of this research effort. As was the case in the sixth AEF deployment, the 366
WG was the lead unit and deployed all of the necessary aircraft. The package consisted
of 12F-15CS, 12F-15Es, 12 F-16CJs, twoB-ls, and four KC-135Rs. The patriot
battalion was deployed as well. The deployment was again designated the 366 AEW.
Since the completion of this deployment in June 1998, the 366 FW has been designated
as one of two rapid-response AEWs (22; 48).
The designation of Mountain Home AFB as a rapid-response AEW was due to
their past AEF experience gained by participation in AEFs II, V, and VII. Additionally,
Mountain Home AFB was designated with AEW on-call responsibility due to the
advantages gained by deploying a composite wing to perform at a deployed location as a

40

composite force. One advantage is the pilots and crews of the different weapon systems
are already accustomed to working together in a training environment. This should reap
benefits in situations where an AEW is required and emphasis is placed on
responsiveness (20; 35).
Another significant advantage of the composite wing is realized in the logistics
support arena. Maintenance personnel assigned to Mountain Home AFB must be
cognizant of requirements levied by each of the individual weapons systems. With inputs
from these logistics experts, wing planners have a greater capability for pairing and
tailoring the initial combat capability to ensure the minimum essential equipment is
rapidly deployed. The evidence for this advantage of a composite force is corroborated
by past AEFs. Lessons learned reports indicate that in many cases a surplus of equipment
was deployed due to lack of communication between the maintenance personnel from the
participating bases (33).
The second 366 AEW was deployed for three months. The Wing was notified 30
days before the deployment as to location and approximate timing. This AEW
deployment was executed as a replacement for the 347 AEW at Bahrain. Once again,
Strategic Warning was arbitrarily assigned and airlift was unrealistic to a stringent nonotice deployment. The seventh AEF was the largest deployment of personnel thus far,
over 1200 personnel at its peak. Finally, the airlifters did not proceed directly to Bahrain,
and this AEW did not meet the 72-hour criterion (20).
One piece of information not revealed by the examination of past AEF
deployments was the origin of the 72-hour criterion. This researcher contacted HQ
USAF/ILXX to determine the lineage for this criterion, but the AEF CONOPS authors
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did not know the origin of the 72-hour criterion. The literature seems to indicate that
prior to the deployment of AEFII, the timing criterion was to demonstrate operational
effect within 48 hours of the issuance of an Execute Order. The conditional 24 hours of
Strategic Warning was later added. No justification was found for the development of
the current 72-hour criterion.

Deployment Timeline
Many of the activities involved in the deployment timeline of an AEW have
already been discussed in this chapter. The AEW is deployed by AMC aircraft in two
phases. The first phase of the deployment is known as the Initial Combat Capability
(ICC). The ICC movement requirement is levied to AMC. ACC requires that the ICC be
in place before the deploying fighters arrive in-theatre. Although the total package size
has differed between AEF deployments due to combat jet makeup, the ICC makeup has
remained somewhat standard. After the completion of AEF II, AMC apportioned the
following airlift for the ICC (see Table 4). This is a total of 22 C-141 equivalents (C-5 =
3C-141s&C-17 = 2C-141s).
The deployment timeline is the compilation of those activities involved with
deploying assets within the ICC. Figure 2 depicts an example of a timeline for an AEF.
Each of the lines within this timeline represent one airlifter. The activities used to
construct a model in this research project will resemble this timeline.
At any point on the deployment timeline, there may be several activities occurring
simultaneously. Furthermore, simultaneously occurring activities may be the
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responsibility of different organizations. An AEW deployment timeline is mostly
controlled by the actions of three separate organizations: the deploying Wing, AMC, and
the supported CINC. AFP 10-417 USAF Deployment Management describes many of the
Table 4. AMC Apportioned Airlift for AEF Deployments (11:2-21)

Reason

C-17
1
0
0
0
0
1

C-5

Lead Wing
Support Wing
Support Wing
Force Protect.
TALCE

Totals

5

Current Plan - Air Refuel direct to beddown
L-Hour
Hour 0 2 4

0 2

4 6

8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48

6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72

Warning Order
•
Crew Activity
RECALL/CREW REST
Execute Order
TALCE C-5 from McGuire
820 Security Forces Group C-5 (FP)
KC-10 (MST & Stage Crews)
C-5 (1) Deploying Unit A
C-5 (2) Deploying Unit B
C-5 (3) Deploying Unit C
C-17 (4) Deploying Unit A
C-141 (5) Deploying Unit A
C-141 (6) Deploying Unit B
C-141 (7) Deploying Unit C
C-141 (8) Deploying Unit A
C-141 (9) Deploying Unit A
Legend

C-141
3
1
1
0
0
5

IMP = Mission Prep (4 hrs)
\CR = Crew Rest
■ OnL and Crew Rest
jOfl= Off-Load
[EJEnr = Enroute/Flying Time
■ Arrival

Figure 2. AEF Timeline (11:2-22)
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actions required for a deploying Wing in order to deploy personnel and cargo. Some of
these actions include: recall, deployment briefing, assignment of cargo and personnel to
specific airlift chalks, processing of personnel, cargo preparation for air worthiness, and
cargo inspection (16:36). Although these events are necessary to the deployment of an
AEW, they do not represent the critical path (3; 32). The critical path is "the chain of
events through a project that sums to the greatest total time" (21:23).
According to ACC and AMC experts, the constraining factor of an AEW is the
airlift and/or tanker support as well as the airfield throughput capacity (3; 32). These will
be discussed in Chapter III. The events which are pertinent to the airlift portion of the
timeline are: recall, crew rest, mission brief and pre-flight, flight times, cargo/personnel
load times, cargo/personnel unload times, and ground times at enroute stops (32). The
cargo and personnel load times are accomplished by wing personnel at the deploying
base, in this case Mountain Home AFB.
After the ICC has been entirely delivered to the deployed location there are still
events that must be accomplished according to the 72-hour criterion. First, the fighter
aircraft must arrive and be regenerated. Regeneration involves a throughflight check,
fueling of fighter aircraft, and munitions loading. Finally, the strike package must fly to
the intended target (3). Together the ICC movement, fighter aircraft regeneration, and
strike form the critical path to demonstrating AEW operational effect in 72 hours. This
study focuses heavily on the movement of the ICC. The airlift portion of this movement
is, as mentioned, assumed to be the critical path. The simultaneous deployment activities
accomplished in parallel with the critical path are ignored in this research study. The

44

chain of key events comprising the critical path along with the assumptions inherent to
the deployment timeline is discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

Summary
The AEW's ability to rapidly respond within 72-hours was not validated by past
AEF deployments. This chapter discussed the significance of the AEF/AEW concept to
NSS, NMS, deliberate planning, and crisis action planning. A brief overview of the
AEW deployment timeline was also given to set the stage for the simulation phase of this
research. The past AEF deployments were reviewed in this Chapter to develop the
framework for the assumptions made in Chapter III.
The seven AEF deployments accomplished to date provide valuable insight into
the concept of operations being developed for the AEW. Although each of the AEF
deployments differed somewhat from the others there were similarities across several of
the deployments. First, the current no-notice requirement was not present in any of the
past AEF deployments. Instead, every deployment save one allowed for at least 30 days
of planning to occur. Even the 347 AEF had more than the 24 hours of Strategic
Warning called for by the stringent 72-hour criterion. Although diplomatic clearances and
overfly rights were established for all of the AEF deployments, data was not available on
the amount of time it took to obtain these clearances. As mentioned, the transportation
requirement for the initial combat capability equipment and personnel has been
somewhat established at around 22 C-141 equivalents. The AEFs have varied in the
amount of time deployed from approximately 30 days to four months; however, most of
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the AEF deployments were planned for a 30-day duration. The analysis of past AEF
deployments accomplished in this chapter are referenced in the following chapters.
The following chapter describes the methodology of this research effort. Chapter
IV presents the research findings and analysis. Finally, Chapter V provides the
conclusions of this research effort.
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III. Methodology

Introduction
This chapter discusses the experimental design and analytical methodology
employed in this study. It begins by revisiting the management question, research
objectives, and research questions set forth in Chapter I. Then the assumptions made for
beginning objective one of the research objectives are presented. Next, the methodology
and results of objectives one and two are presented in order to lay the groundwork for
subsequent design-related issues. Finally, simulation modeling, used to accomplish
objectives three and four, is presented and discussed as the most appropriate experimental
tool for this study.
As stated in Chapter I, the objectives of this research were accomplished in four
phases. The objectives of the research are geared towards answering the management
question posed in Chapter I. The overarching problem is in quantifying the response time
capability of an AEW. The question is whether the AEW can meet the 72-hour capability
, set by senior Air Force leadership. In order to meet these objectives research questions
were presented. It is important at this point to restate those research questions.
1. What key events represent the critical path for the first 72 hours of an AEW
deployment timeline?
2. What are the approximated distributions for each of the key events in this
deployment timeline?
3. What is the current probability for completing an AEW in 72 hours?
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4. What are the new probabilities for completing an AEW given changes in
conceptual model assumptions to include: throughput capacity (i.e., increase
in working maximum-on-ground), maintenance downtime due to airlift
failures, and accomplishment of air-to-air refueling for all deploying airlifters?

Recall that research question one responds to research objective one, and so on.
Furthermore, the results of accomplishing research objectives one and two were used as
inputs to develop the simulation models used for objectives three and four. A baseline
simulation model was developed to address research objective three. This model was
altered in order to develop three different models to address research objective four.
Each altered model deviated from the baseline model, and cumulative alterations were
not accomplished. The key events representing the critical path for the first 72 hours of
the AEW timeline along with the approximated distributions of these key events are also
addressed in this chapter. In order to determine the key events representing the critical
path for this timeline several assumptions were made. A listing and discussion of these
assumption follows.

Assumptions
The assumptions presented in this section were gathered from a variety of
sources. Mostly, the assumptions were gleaned from the review of literature
accomplished in Chapter II. In some instances, assumptions were garnered from personal
interviews with experts. Interviews were primarily conducted by use of telephone or
electronic mail. Additionally, a visit to Scott AFB was accomplished in May 1999,
where personal interviews were conducted with planning experts from HQ AMC/DOX.
The purpose of these interviews was to develop assumptions not found in the literature, to
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identify the key events comprising the critical path of an AEW deployment timeline, to
approximate the distributions for the identified key events, and finally to assist in
development of the conceptual model.
In some cases, it was necessary to reconcile assumptions, which differed between
past AEF deployments. In other cases, assumptions had not yet been agreed upon by
planning experts from different major commands. This reinforces that the AEW concept
is a work in progress. The assumptions made for identifying the key events and
eventually developing the simulation models may be found below. A complete
discussion is included for each assumption. The discussion of each assumption includes:
the reason for making the assumption; the source of the assumption; the impact, if
pertinent, of the assumption on the deployment timeline; and dissenting opinions, if any,
for the assumption. In order to comply with research objective four, assumptions 3, 7,
and 13 were altered, and corresponding simulation models were developed. Included in
the discussion of these three assumptions is the explanation'of the alteration. The
assumptions found below are not exhaustive nor do they represent all of the planning
necessary for the undertaking of an AEW deployment. Instead, they represent the
minimum list of assumptions necessary to provide the framework for identification of the
deployment timeline critical path and eventually the construction of a valid simulation
model.
Assumption 1: Diplomatic Clearances are not a Constraint. The ACC CONOPS
for a USCENTCOMAEF (Draft) assumes "the necessary diplomatic clearances will be
obtained either before Strategic Warning or within the 24-hour period between Strategic
Warning and the Execute order" (2:12). This assumption is paramount to the success of
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any deployment. Without diplomatic clearances an AEW is not a viable option for
political decision-makers. This also assumes that overfly rights have been granted for
airlifters, tankers, and fighters. An AEW could not meet the 72-hour criterion without
both diplomatic clearances and overfly rights. Therefore this assumption lends itself
towards achieving the 72-hour criterion.
Assumption 2: Deployment is to a Warm Base. This assumption may also be
found in the ACC CONOPS. A warm base "at a minimum will include runway, water,
special and some general purpose vehicles, POL, munitions, NAVAIDS and some means
of expedient billeting" (2:12). This assumption dictates the need for base operating
support capabilities contained within the initial combat capability (ICC) discussed in
Chapter II.
Assumption 3: Air-Refueling Operations are not Accomplished on Deploying
Airlifters. This assumption does not represent the current ACC philosophy (20). This
assumption was made based on personal interviews with personnel from HQ AMC/DOX
during a site visit to Scott AFB (32). At the time of this research, the USAF Concept of
Operations for AEF Implementation, a product of HQ USAF, had not reconciled the
disagreement over this assumption (15). According to AMC sources, refueling airlifters
within the first 72 hours would require AMC to commit 110 aircraft and 135 aircrews.
These numbers count each mission as an aircraft. AMC planning experts stated that the
probability of providing this amount of support was low for the first 72 hours (32).
Justification for this assumption can also be found in the review of past AEF
deployments, accomplished in Chapter II.
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The fighters will be air-refueled, and fly direct to the deployed location in this
scenario. AMC experts stated that it would require at least 33 air-to-air refueling tankers
to support the direct flight of the fighters.
The absence of air-refueling operations for AMC airlifters requires the use of
enroute stops. The base used as an enroute stop in this research effort was Moron AB,
Spain. This base was selected due to its use as an enroute stop for several of the past
AEFs. Additionally, Moron is preferred as an enroute and staging base by AMC planners
due to its robust capabilities (32). Airlifters are also required to make an enroute stop
after departure from Mt. Home AFB, at Dover AFB, DE. Refueling operations and crew
changes are performed at both Dover and Moron. This assumption detracts from the
AEW's capability to meet the 72-hour requirement when compared to the ACC directflight philosophy.
The AEW working group assumption that air-to-air refueling is accomplished on
deploying airlifters and its impact on AEW response capability is explored in this
analysis. The baseline model assumption was altered to address research objective four
by developing Model IV.
Assumption 4: Initial Combat Capability (ICC) Must be Completely Available
Before Fighters Arrive. This assumption assumes that the equipment and personnel
within the initial combat capability are necessary to conduct fighter-operations. The ICC
is made up of assets directly related to supporting the fighter package or combat support
forces, as well as base operating support equipment and personnel. An argument could
be made that it is not essential to have the entire ICC in-place at the deployed location to
regenerate arriving aircraft for the first strike. However ACC's position is that the ICC is
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needed in-place before the jets arrive in order to: mitigate risk, provide infrastructure
support, and to begin initial base operating support set-up (10; 35). This assumption acts
to provide strict compliance to time-phasing of the AEW in the first 72 hours. If the ICC
is not in-place before the scheduled arrival of the fighters, then the AEW has not met the
72-hour criterion. Recall from Chapter II that none of the AEWs met this assumption.
Assumption 5: Six C-17s and 3 C-5s are Sufficient for the ICC Movement
Requirement. This assumption is actually two-fold. First, a simplifying assumption is
made that the airlift mix is known. In reality, the aircraft mix for a no-notice deployment
is unpredictable. AMC will provide airlift assets as available to accomplish the actual
movement of troops and cargo. The impact of this particular airlift mix on the AEWs
capability to meet the 72-hour criterion was not fully explored by this study. The C-141
was not considered for inclusion into the mix due to its limited carrying capacity, 20
short-tons, compared to the C-5, 65 short tons; and the C-17, 45 short-tons (32). Next,
the mix of the C-5s and C-17s was developed based on a number of different factors to
include: load times, reliability, and availability. Another airlift mix may lend itself
towards increasing the AEWs capability to meet the 72-hour requirement; however it is
just as likely that a airlift mix which decreases this same capability could present itself
(32).
The second aspect of this assumption is that the given airflow is sufficient for the
ICC movement requirement. Although the ICC is not fully developed by the AEW
working group at Mountain Home AFB, the current philosophy of.the working group is
that nine airlifters will move the ICC. Colonel Duke validated the given airflow
commenting that it should be sufficient to move the ICC (20). The ICC currently being
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developed is for the Eagle package or 12 F-15Cs, 12 F-15Es, 12 F-16CJs, 4 B-ls, and 4
KC-135s (20). The airlift requirement may change based upon the outcome of the AEW
working group.
Assumption 6: Tanker Air Lift Control Elements (TALCE), and Force Protection
will be Deployed. This assumption was based on past AEFs as well as the interviews of
both ACC and AMC planners. The movement of these capabilities adds four airlifters
that must deploy prior to the deployment of Mountain Home AFB ICC assets. TALCEs
(see Appendix B) must be deployed to the enroute location at Moron AB, Spain and the
deployed location. Each of the TALCEs will be deployed utilizing a C-5. In addition, a
force protection contingent will be deployed to the AEW location in accordance with
AMC plans and past AEFs. The force protection group will be deployed on one C-5.
Finally, a C-17 will carry additional maintenance equipment and stage crews to Moron
AB. These capabilities are necessary to prepare for the arrival of AEW assets and airlift
at both locations (3; 26; 32).
This assumption represents the minimum amount of airlift necessary for the AEW
scenario. AMC experts indicated that the aircraft carrying Moron AB-bound cargo and
personnel would remain at Moron AB. These aircraft would then be used as spares in
case of AMC aircraft landing at Moron enroute to the deployed location (32). Therefore,
changes would only increase airlift thereby, decreasing the capability of the AEW to meet
the 72-hour criterion. This assumption is not altered during the development of models
to address research objective four. The airlifters deployed to Moron AB in the baseline
model are also deployed to Moron in the other models. Although no enroute stop is
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required for the direct flight in the air refueling model, it is likely that AMC would still
deploy assets to a European base such as Moron AB to prepare for possible diverts.
Assumption 7: Failures are not Considered. The reliability of AMC aircraft was
not taken into consideration for research objective three. This was a simplifying
assumption. This assumption lends itself towards the AEW meeting the 72-hour
requirement because in reality failures do occur. AMC's use of spares at Moron AB is
one method for combating the reality of failures. This assumption will be altered to
assess its affect, during research objective four, on AEW response capability. The
alteration for this assumption is discussed later in this chapter under Model III.
Assumption 8: No Notice. This scenario employs a simplifying assumption that
there is no notice before the Strategic Warning Order is issued. Theoretically, this
assumption is possible. A no-notice AEW deployment could occur during a scenario in
which most of the steps of crisis action planning are skipped. As discussed in the crisis
action planning section of Chapter II, a scenario, which required a flexible deterrent
option, may also require rapid response. This study attempts to assess the AEW's
capability to meet this worst-case scenario. AEW planners at the 366 WG AEW working
group are currently working under a different assumption. Their efforts assume that there
will be time to accomplish "left-of-the-line" planning (19; 20). This term assumes that a
crisis will proceed through the stages of crisis action planning. This assumption
represents the more likely scenario. The left-of-the-line planning concept holds that there
will be time during the stages of crisis action planning to increase military readiness
levels. With left-of-the-line planning some or all of the following actions could occur
before the strategic warning: AMC crews could be recalled and put into crew rest, 366
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WG personnel could be recalled, aircraft could be prepared for deployment, and cargo
preparation actions would begin (19; 20). The model developed in this research effort
assumes that no actions occur before the Strategic Warning Order.
Assumption 9: Mountain Home AFB, ID. This is a simplifying assumption. The
366 WG will be the deploying organization as one of two on-call rapid response AEWs.
Assumption 10: Strategic Warning Actions. This assumption acts to simplify the
model development. It assumes that there is no delineation between the actions that may
be taken during Strategic Warning and the actions taken after the Execute Order. In other
words, events not usually accomplished prior to the issuance of the Execute Order may
be accomplished. An example will serve to illustrate the impact of this assumption. If
during the course of the deployment, an airlifter were completely loaded with cargo and
personnel at Mountain Home AFB then, the airlifter would be allowed to deploy prior to
the receipt of the Execution or Deployment Order. This assumption increases the
likelihood of the AEW meeting the 72-hour criterion within the confines of the model.
Assumption 11: Munitions. The munitions required for arriving fighters are
prepositioned at the deployed location. Intratheatre airlift assets may accomplish this.
This has been the case for more than one of the past AEFs (31:8). Additionally,
munitions build-up and storage areas are assumed to be available at the deployed
location.
Assumption 12: Force Protection. Past AEFs have used force protection assets
sourced from the deploying lead unit while others have used security forces from the
Force Protection Battle Lab at Kelly AFB, TX (20). The force protection in this scenario
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will be supplied from Dover AFB. This is a simplifying assumption which acts to
increase the capability of the modeled AEW to meet the 72-hour criterion.
Assumption 13: Maximum-on-Ground fMOGV Several MOG assumptions were
made to develop the two simulation models. The assumptions varied between the two
simulation models. Two types of maximum on ground measures were used for the
models; parking MOG and working MOG. Parking MOG refers to the maximum number
of aircraft which can be physically accommodated on the airfield in question. Working
MOG refers to the number of aircraft which can be simultaneously worked at one time,
where "worked" refers to maintenance, load/offload operations, and aircraft fueling
(12:5).
The first model assumes a working MOG of two for both Mountain Home AFB
and the deployed location. This was based on the available Materiel Handling Equipment
(MHE) at Mountain Home AFB and past AEF locations. This assumption is accepted by
planners at AMC and ACC (20; 32). Additionally, the first model assumes parking
MOGs of four at Mountain Home AFB and the deployed location in accordance with
AMC assumptions (32). AMC experts were consulted in assuming a parking MOG of six
for Moron AB for both models, and due to its capacity the parking MOG at Dover AFB
was considered unlimited in the simulation model. Airlifters were not loaded/offloaded
at Moron AB or Dover AFB; therefore, working MOGs were not applicable.
According to AMC and ACC planners the airfield throughput capability is a
constraint for meeting the 72-hour AEW criterion (20 ; 32; 35). The working MOG is
used in establishing the airflow schedule (see Assumption 15). As previously discussed,
the working MOG constraint is relaxed for analysis in the second simulation model
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developed to meet research objective four. Based on conversations with Colonel Duke,
lead planner for the AEW working group, the working MOG was doubled to four at both
Mountain Home AFB and the deployed location in the second model. The MOG
relationship to throughput capability is illustrated by the following Air Mobility planning
factor formula (12:5).

. • r- ,, ^
,
^ , M(MOG)(AveragePayload)(OperatingHours),
ar.
J
§
/ t
Airfield Throughput Capability = -^
-^- -(.85)
(GroundTime)

The parking MOGs were also increased to five at both the deployed location and
Mountain Home AFB in the second model.
Assumption 14: Patriot Battalion Ignored. The patriot battalion may use initial
airlift in the first 72 hours; however, a simplifying assumption was made to not include
the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) in either model. This assumption was made due to the
lack of definite guidance as to (ADA) time phasing.
Assumption 15: Airlift Flow Timing. The scheduled flow of airflow is dependent
upon many variables. These include airfield throughput capability, aircrew availability,
and airlift availability. Based on interviews with AMC planners, airflow schedules were
built for all models. The models parallel reality in that AMC aircraft may not flow
exactly as scheduled. The airlift flow for three of the four models assumes that the first
six airlifters are scheduled at once. The first four airlifters, as mentioned, are dedicated to
TALCE, AMC maintenance and aircrews, and force protection. The next two airlifters
are sent to Mountain Home AFB for AEW movement. The last seven airlifters are
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scheduled to arrive Mountain Home every two hours. The scheduled aircraft order after
the first two aircraft (one C-5 and one C-17) for Mountain Home AFB is: C-17, C-17, C5, C-17, C-17, C-17, C-5. This flow was developed to minimize the burden on Mountain
Home AFB deployment personnel, as C-5s require more preparation time than C-17s
(32).
The airlift flow for the relaxed working MOG constraint model (Model II)
assumes that the first eight airlifters are scheduled at once. The same aircraft order is
followed for this model; however, subsequent to the first four aircraft, airlift are
scheduled to arrive Mountain Home AFB every hour.
Assumption 16: Crew Rest Waived to 12 Hours. The normal 16-hour crew rest
requirement is waived to 12 hours for AMC crews. This is a standard assumption for
time-critical deployments (32).
The preceding assumptions were developed in order to establish the framework
for identifying the critical path key events on the AEW deployment timeline. The
following section describes the identified key events.

Key Events Representing the Critical Path
This section describes the methodology and findings of research questions one
and two. In order to identify the key events listed and described in this section various
experts in AMC and ACC were consulted. Based on the proceeding assumptions
consensus was reached during personal interviews with planning experts. Interviewees
agreed that AMC aircraft are a resource constraint in the deployment arena. Given the
no-notice assumption, outlined above, AMC planners agreed that airlifters could not be
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deployed to Mountain Home AFB before wing personnel had processed cargo and
personnel (32). ACC personnel stated that personnel and cargo could be available for
deployment within 12 hours of strategic warning; however, AMC planners stated that,
given the assumptions of this scenario, airlifters would not arrive at Mountain Home AFB
before this 12 hour point (32; 35). Therefore, the events that would occur at Mountain
Home AFB prior to the arrival of airlift are ignored for this analysis. Any event not
specifically enumerated is assumed to occur in parallel with the critical path key events.
The possibility that events comprising a non-critical path may in reality emerge as the
critical path was not fully explored by this study.
The following paragraphs list and describe the key events, which are assumed by
this study to comprise the critical path of the AEW deployment timeline. Included in the
description of each key event is the source for approximating the distribution of time
required for completing each of the events. The distribution parameters for each key
event may be found in Table 5.
Key Event 1: Recall. The recall is accomplished immediately upon receipt of the
Strategic Warning Order. During the recall AMC personnel are ordered into crew rest.
This key event refers to the delay between receipt of the strategic warning and actual
notification of all recalled aircrew-members. Planning experts at AMC/DOX
approximated the probability distribution parameters for recall duration (32).
Key Event 2: Crew Rest. This event is required according to Air Force
Instruction (AFI) 11-202V3. Recalled aircrews are put into crew rest in anticipation of
an airlift mission. Crew rest "is the non-duty period before the flight duty period begins.
Its purpose is to allow the aircrew member the opportunity for adequate rest before
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performing in-flight duties" (14:42). Crew rest is a minimum of 12 hours. There was no
distribution used for this key event.
Key Event 3: Mission Brief/Preflieht. The mission brief/preflight times were
treated as a single duration and did not have an associated distribution. This key event
refers to those actions aircrews must accomplish in order to prepare for an airlift mission.
These include; reviewing pertinent notices to airmen (NOTAMs), inspecting the airplane
in accordance with aircraft specific technical orders, determining fueling requirements,
insuring adequate fuel on-board, reviewing procedures and limitations, and mission
planning. The times associated with this key event differed across types of airlifter.
These times were supplied by AMC planners (14:8; 32).
Key Event 4: Flight Times. This is the amount of time airlift aircraft take to fly
from one location to another. Flight times were approximated by use of the Joint Flow
and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) flight time calculator. The parameters
for the distribution associated with flight times were approximated by AMC planners.
Flight times were allowed to vary by plus or minus half an hour on all legs except the
direct flight from Mt. Home AFB to the deployed location used in Model IV. The
optimistic/pessimistic parameters were plus and minus one hour respectively from the
most likely duration on this leg due to the length of the flight. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
was used as the AEW deployed location for the purposes of flight time calculations only.
Dhahran was used for this purpose due to its proximity to past AEF locations (32).
Key Event 5: Load/Unload Times. This key event refers to the time AMC aircraft
encounter as a ground time for any loading or offloading mission at any airfield. Loading
and offloading includes personnel and cargo. This time includes all actions taken by the
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aircraft after landing to immediately before take-off. Times differed across different
types of airlift. The respective load times were equal to the unload times within aircraft
types. The mean for this key event time was given by Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403. The
variance for this key event time was approximated by AMC (12; 32).
Key Event 6: Ground Times. During the course of the deployment timeline for
three of the four developed models airlifters are required to make enroute stops at Dover
AFB, DE and Moron AB, Spain. This key event accounts for the expired duration during
these stops. As previously mentioned, enroute stops were not made in the air-refueling
model (Model IV). It is assumed that each aircraft is fueled enroute stops and aircrews
are swapped. The aircrews are swapped due to crew duty days limitations (32). Ground
times for the baseline model (Model I) were approximated by AMC planners.
The ground time probability distribution was altered in order to simulate
downtime in Model III, developed to address research objective four. This alteration
entailed allowing airlifters to require maintenance during enroute stops. The alteration to
this key event aligns with the alteration of assumption 7, previously discussed. The
optimistic and most likely parameters for the ground time probability distribution used in
Model III are the same as the baseline. The pessimistic parameter for this probability
distribution was estimated by calculating an average of mean time-to-repair data for nine
selected airlifter components (50:14). The inclusion of the pessimistic parameter in the
probability distribution allowed for greater variance in airlifter ground times.
Key Event 7: Regeneration of Fighters. This time is not included in the actual
simulation models. Currently, AEW planners are allocating six hours for the
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regeneration time. This was the time duration used for this study. The concept assumes
that four fighters from each group of 12 are regenerated (19; 20).
Key Event 8: Flight Time to Target. The flight time to target was also not
included in the simulation model. AEW planners currently plan on a three-hour flight
time. This research recognizes that flight times may vary greatly from scenario to
scenario; however, three hours was used in this analysis.
The proceeding key events were used to construct a timeline for the AEW.
Distributions were approximated for all events except crew rest duration, mission
brief/preflight times, and fighter aircraft flight time-to-target. These events were treated
as constants. Due to lack of actual data, interviewees were asked to provide an
optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely time for each of the key events. This provided the
parameters for the triangular distribution used in the simulation modeling. "The
triangular distribution can be used when assumptions are made about the minimum,
maximum, and modal values of the random variable" (6:196). The distributions for these
events may be found in Tables 5 and 6.
The triangular distribution was also used due to its simplicity. This distribution
was easily explained to interviewees when soliciting inputs for the parameters. Next,
AMC planners were asked to develop a timeline based on the assumptions, limitations,
and scope of this research scenario. AMC planners agreed that six airlifters would be
deployed as soon as possible. The first six airlifters are utilized in the simulation models
as reported in Table 7.
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Table 5. Approximation of Key Event Time Distributions (hours).
Key Events
Recall
Crew Rest
Mission brief/
Preflight C-5
Mission brief/
Preflight C-17
Load C-5
Unload C-5
Load/unload C-17
Ground times
(baseline)
Ground times
(Model III)

Minimum
Time
1
12

Most Likely
Time
2
12

Maximum
Time
4
12

4

4

4

3
2
2
1.75

3
4.25
3.25
2.25

3
5.25
5.25
3.25

2

3

4

2

3

7.15

Table 6. Calculated Flight Times (hours).
Airlift place of origin
Dover AFB
Deployed Location
Charleston AFB

Mountain Home AFB
4.5
4.5
17.5
4.5

Moron AB
Not applicable
6.5
6
7.8

Deployed Location
Not applicable
12.5
Not applicable
Not applicable

Table 7. First Six Airlifters
Aircraft Type
C-5
C-17
C-5
C-5
C-5
C-17

Origin
Dover AFB
Charleston
AFB
Dover AFB
Dover AFB
Travis AFB or
Dover AFB
Charleston
AFB

Cargo
TALCE
Maintenance assets
Aircrews
Force Protection
TALCE
366 AEW personnel
and equipment
366 AEW personnel
and equipment
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Destination
Moron AB, Spain
Moron AB, Spain
AEW location
AEW location
AEW location
AEW location

After this initial push of six airlifters, succeeding airlift will be scheduled to arrive
at Mountain Home AFB every two hours for three of the models and every hour under
the under the altered MOG model (Model II). As stated in the assumptions section, the
initial combat capability of the AEW package at Mountain Home AFB is transported by
six C-17s and 3 C-5s. Therefore, the cargo and personnel required for movement in the
first 72 hours of the AEW, are transported using six C-5s and 7 C-17s. Each of the
airlifters experiences its own combination of key events in order to transport cargo and
personnel to its designated location, either Moron AB or the deployed location. The
timelines for each individual airlifter are the 13 individual pieces, which make up the
deployment timeline, thus the conceptual model for this study. The process diagrams for
the baseline model (Model I) are illustrated in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6. All airlifters
transporting Mountain Home AFB equipment and personnel follow the same process
diagram in each of the models except the air-refueling model (Model IV). The force

Crew Rest/
Mission Brief/
Preflight Time
(Aircraft Loaded) / Aircraft
^1
Departs
Dover

Figure 3. TALCE to Moron AB, Spain.
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Dover to
Moron
Flight Time

protection C-5 and the TALCE C-5 also adhere to the same process flow diagram across
all models except Model IV. In both cases Model IV differs in that enroute stops at
Moron and Dover are excluded.

Crew Rest/
Mission Brief/
Preflight Time
(Aircraft Loaded)

Charleston to
Moron
Flight Time

Figure 4. Maintenance and Stage Crew to Moron AB, Spain,

Crew Rest/
Mission Brief/
Preflight Time
(Aircraft Loaded)
^i

Dover to
Moron
Flight Time
Departs
Dover

Moron to
Destination
Flight Time

Figure 5. TALCE and Force Protection to Destination.

65

Crew Rest/
Mission Brief/
Preflight Time
/ Aircraft
(Aircraft Loaded) / Takeoff

M

Origin to
Mt. Home
Flight Time

From
Origin

Dover to
Moron
Flight Time
-^1

/ Aircraft
Arrives
Moron

Ground Time
^f

/ Aircraft
Departs

Moron to
Destination
Flight Time

Figure 6. AEW Personnel and Equipment to Destination.

Research Design
The research design was developed to answer research questions three and four.
The decision to use simulation as a tool in this research was based on the system
complexity inherent to the deployment timeline. Simulation is simply "the process of
designing a mathematical-logical model of a real system and experimenting with this
model on a computer" (39:6). Furthermore, "simulation enables the study of, and
experimentation with, the internal interactions of a complex system" (6:4). The use of
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Simulation also allows for the evaluation of new designs or polices prior to their
implementation (6:4). This simulation modeling advantage enables this research to
evaluate the effects of changing three model assumptions on the ability of the AEW to
meet the 72-hour criterion. In order to accomplish a thorough and sound simulation
study Banks, Carson, and Nelson have organized eleven steps to be followed (6:13-18).
1. Problem Formulation. Simply a clear statement of the problem
2. Setting of Objectives and Overall Project Plan. The objectives indicate which
questions will be answered by the simulation. The project plan entails the cost
of the study, number of people involved, and the time needed to accomplish
the study.
3. Model Conceptualization. This step is the art of building a model of a system.
This involves abstracting the essential features of a problem and selecting and
modifying the basic assumptions that characterize the system.
4. Data Collection. This is the specification and collection of the inputs to the
model.
5. Model Translation. The actual translation of the conceptual model into a
computer recognizable format.
6. Verification. This is the process of establishing that the computer program is
performing properly.
7. Validation. This is the process of ensuring the model is an accurate
representation of the real system.
8. Experimental Design. This is the process of establishing the conditions
required for actual model runs. This includes the length of simulation runs,
number of runs, and initial conditions of the system under study.
9. Production Runs and Analysis. This step focuses on the actual running of the
model as well as the subsequent analysis of model outputs to make inferences.
10. Documentation and Reporting. Documentation is the complete explanation of
how the model was constructed. Reporting refers to the conveyance of the
model results to others.
11. Implementation. This is the process of implementing decisions based upon
the simulation.
Steps 1 and 2, problem formulation and setting overall objectives, have already
been discussed at the beginning of this chapter as well as Chapter I. The problem for this
simulation study was formulated in Chapter I with the management question. Likewise,
the objectives and overall project plan were discussed in Chapter I and earlier in this
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Chapter. Steps 3 and 4, model conceptualization and data acquisition have been
discussed extensively in the previous sections of this chapter; however, a review of the
four models is pertinent at this juncture.
Model I. This is the baseline model developed to address research objective
three. It represents the original assumptions made in this research regarding an AEW
deployment, the key deployment event times, and the event times distributions.
Model II. This is the first of three models developed to address research objective
four. Each of the three models represented alterations to the baseline model. This
particular simulation model was developed to assess the sensitivity of the dependent
variable, probability of demonstrating operational effect in 72 hours or less, to a change
in airfield throughput capacity at both Mountain Home AFB and the deployed location.
The working MOG constraint was increased to a capacity of four airlifters based on
current AEW working group assumptions.
Model III. This model was developed to assess the impact of including airlift
reliability as a possible limiting factor on the dependent variable, probability of
demonstrating operational effect in 72 hours or less. The pessimistic distribution
parameter for airlift ground times was increased by 3.15 hours. Aircraft were only
allowed to fail at the enroute locations. Furthermore, actual failures only occurred
according to the random variate sampling of the discussed ground time distribution. This
model attempted to inject the realism of mechanical failure into the modeled scenario.
Model IV. This model was developed to assess the sensitivity of the dependent
variable, probability of demonstrating operational effect in 72 hours or less, to a change
in the air-refueling assumption. Enroute stops at Dover and Moron were excluded in this
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scenario. This model assumes that all airlift are air-refueled enroute to the deployed
location. HQ USAF AEF CONOPS does not currently sanction the air-refueling
assumption. Interviews revealed disagreement over this assumption between ACC and
AMC planners.
Step 5, model translation, is covered by Appendix C, which provides the actual
programming language for the simulation models used in this study. The conceptual
model contained in Figures 3,4, 5, and 6 as well as the approximated distributions for
each key event were translated to computer code using Pritsker's AWESIM™ simulation
software. The assumptions enumerated earlier in this chapter established the framework
for model conceptualization. The resources used for the model were each base's parking
maximum-on-ground as well as the working maximum on ground. There were five
resources used in the model: Mountain Home AFB parking MOG, Moron AB parking
MOG, deployed location parking MOG, Mountain Home AFB working MOG, and
deployed location working MOG. These resources are discussed in the preceding
assumptions section. Steps 6 and 7, verification and validation efforts respectively
attempt to answer the questions: was the model built right and was the right model built?
Verification for the model used in this study was accomplished by using a number
of different methods. The verification efforts are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. The
validation effort was accomplished by use of an informal validation technique known as
face validation. "Face validation is useful mostly as a preliminary approach to validation
in the early stages of development" (17:4-3). This study may be considered an
exploratory approach, since it is the first attempt at modeling the AEW timeline for the
first 72 hours. AMC planning experts were asked during model construction whether
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outputs were reasonable. Beyond consultation with experts it was difficult to compare
outputs from the model with past AEF deployment times. This was due to the
inconsistency of past AEF deployment conditions with the assumptions stated earlier in
this chapter. The assumption having the largest impact on any attempted comparison
between past AEF deployments and the model used in this study was the no-notice
assumption.
Step 8, experimental design, has already been discussed to some extent in this chapter.
First, the assumptions and key events, mentioned earlier, establish the initial conditions
for the models. In order to determine the number of runs necessary two professors at the
Air Force Institute of Technology were consulted. It was decided that at least 150 runs
would be necessary to later approximate the output distribution for each model.
Analysis, or step 9, was accomplished by using a software program known as Statistix™.
Statistix was used to accomplish a Wilk-Shapiro test for normality on the resulting output
data. Estimation of the probability distribution parameters was also accomplished
utilizing Statistix. Once the distribution parameters were approximated an appropriate
test was accomplished to determine the probability of deploying an AEW in less than 63
hours for each of the modeled scenarios (i.e., determining P(X < 63 hours), where X is a
random variable describing the deployment time). The 63-hour value is obtained by
subtracting the time to regenerate fighters (6 hours) and the time for fighters to fly to their
targets (3 hours) for the 72-hour criterion.
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Summary
This chapter presented the results from accomplishing research objectives 1 and 2.
The assumptions and key event times established a framework for the simulation
modeling research design. The first nine steps of simulation modeling were discussed in
this chapter. The complete analysis of results will be presented in Chapter IV.
Implementation, step 10, will be discussed in V. Finally, step 11, documentation and
reporting is the purpose of this entire research effort; however, simulation model
documentation may be found in Appendix C.
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IV. Findings and Analysis
Chapter Overview
The simulation experiment described in Chapter III was designed expressly to
answer research questions three and four. Likewise, the set of statistical tests employed
was selected toward that end. The results from research questions one and two were
presented in the previous chapter. To review, research questions three and four were
presented in Chapter I.
3. What is the current probability for completing an AEW in 72 hours?
4. What are the new probabilities for completing an AEW given changes in
conceptual model assumptions to include: throughput capacity (i.e., increase
in working maximum-on-ground), maintenance downtime due to airlift
failures, and accomplishment of air-to-air refueling for all deploying airlifters?
This chapter first presents verification efforts accomplished on the simulation models.
Next, the statistical analyses accomplished on the simulation data as well as the results of
these tests are presented.

Verification Efforts
Recall from Chapter III that verification deals with answering the question, did I
build the model right? Verification for the model used in this study was accomplished
by using a number of different methods. According to Banks and Carson, there are many
procedures that may be followed in the verification process. First, they advise that the
computerized representation be checked by someone other than its developer. This was
accomplished by Major Alan Johnson a simulation modeling Professor at the Air Force
Institute of Technology. Another suggestion from Banks and Carson was that a flow
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diagram be created to document the model logic. This was accomplished in Chapter III
in the four figures presented in Chapter III (6: 401).
In addition to the Banks and Carson suggestions, model construction was
accomplished piece-wise for verification purposes. Each of the sub-processes were built
individually and tested to verify accurate performance. Then the model was put together
and tested as a whole. The number of airlifters for this deployment was equal to the
number of entities used for the model. The model accurately allowed all thirteen entities
to flow through the entire system. Next, the distributions were held to their minimum
and maximum levels to establish a range across both models. Finally, the resources used
in the model were decreased to ensure decreasing resources would affect the performance
of the model. This was true, especially for the working MOG resources at both the
deployed location and Mt. Home AFB. 150 runs were accomplished for both of the
models for verification purposes.

Analysis
This section discusses the analysis performed on the simulation modeling output
data. Additionally, the results of the analysis are presented. 150 runs of each model were
accomplished. The data was then imported into Statistix for analysis.
Each data point represented the time required to successfully conduct an AEW
deployment from issuance of Warning Order through unloading of the last airlifter
transporting initial combat capability (ICC) equipment and personnel. Simulation model
output provided the dependent variable in hours. Model I represented the baseline model
of an AEW deployment with a working maximum-on-ground (MOG) constraint of two at
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Mt. Home AFB and the deployed location. Model II represented an increase in the
working maximum-on-ground constraint at Mt. Home AFB and the deployed location. A
corresponding change in scheduled airflow to every hour was also present in Model II.
Model III was developed to simulate limited aircraft failures and repair at the enroute
locations. Finally, Model IV represents a change in the baseline assumption to simulate
an AEW scenario in which all deploying airlifters are air-refueled. Each model run may
be viewed as a separate AEW deployment. In order for each modeled AEW to meet the
72-hour criterion the resulting output must be 63 hours or less. As previously discussed,
the 63 hours is the difference between the 72-hour criterion and the time to regenerate
fighter aircraft (six hours) plus flight time to target (three hours), neither of which were
included in the simulation models.
Wilk-Shapiro Test for Normality. The raw data from all models was imported
into Statistix to determine whether or not the resulting probability distribution for each
model output was normally distributed. The test accomplished to determine whether or
not the simulation output data was normally distributed was the Wilk-Shapiro/Rankit plot
test for normality. Using the Statistix program, the Wilk-Shapiro/Rankit Plot procedure
determines whether a variable conforms to a normal distribution. In order to use the
Wilk-Shapiro test for normality the data must be a random sample. This condition was
met due to Awesim's use of random variates to generate values for all triangular
distributed key deployment event times. A rankit plot of the variable was created, and an
approximate Wilk-Shapiro normality statistic, the Shapiro-Francia statistic, is
determined. According to Shapiro and Francia, An Approximate Analysis of Variance
Test for Normality, when this statistic is at or above .967, the assumption of normality
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holds true (43:215-216). The i-th rankit is defined as the expected value of the i-th order
statistic for the sample, assuming the sample was from a normal distribution. The order
statistics of a sample are the sample values reordered by their rank. If the sample
conforms to a normal distribution, a plot of the rankits against the order statistics should
result in a straight line, except for random variation. The approximate Wilk-Shapiro
statistic calculated is the square of the linear correlation between the rankits and the order
statistics. Systematic departure of the rankit plot from a linear trend indicates nonnormality, as does a small value for the Wilk-Shapiro statistic. One or a few points
departing from the linear trend near the extremes of the plot are indicative of outliers.
(44:258-259). The Statistix rankit plots for each model may be found in Appendix D.
Test statistics of .989, .9879, .9933 and .9962 were calculated respectively for
models I, II, III, and IV. Additionally, the rankit plots depict a straight-line relationship
indicative of sample data from a normal distribution. Therefore, a normal probability
distribution may be used to approximate the probability distributions for each set of data.
Parameters. Given that the sample data from each simulation run was normally
distributed, the estimated parameters of the probability distribution were calculated for
the corresponding data sets. The parameters for a normal distribution are the mean (u)
and standard deviation (a). These parameters as well as the range for each probability
distribution are depicted in Table 8.
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Table 8. Model Parameters (hours)

Model I
Model II
Model III
Model IV

Mean (u,)
69.336
61.302
71.431
63.660

Standard Deviation (a)
1.2932
1.3243
1.9663
1.368

Range
Range
(Minimum) (Maximum)
66.681
72.7265
58.512
64.979
66.5
76.547
60.306
66.908

Z-score Analysis. The parameters in Table 8 were used to determine the z-score
for meeting the 63-hour criterion. The area under the probability density curve to the left
of the 63-hour point is the probability of a successful AEW. The formula used to
calculate the z-score is: z =

er

— where X = 63.

The z-score for the baseline AEW Model I was -4.90. The z-score for the AEW with
increased working maximum-on-ground constraint, Model II, was 1.28. The z-score for
the AEW with simulated downtime, Model HI, was -4.29. Finally, the z-score for the
air-refueling scenario, Model IV, was -.58. These z-scores were used to determine the
P(X < 63 hours). The P(X < 63) for Model I and Model III was interpolated to be
approximately 0. The P(X < 63) for Model II was calculated to be approximately .898.
Finally, the P(X < 63) for Model IV was calculated to be approximately .28. Quartiles
were also calculated for the data probability distributions as well. These quartiles are the
25l, 50l, and 75th percentiles of each data set. The value (X) given at each calculated
quartile (/*) represents the random variable value at which the probability that the AEW
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was accomplished at or below that value (x) is equal to /. These values may be found in
Table 9. The actual probability density functions may be found in Figure 7.
Table 9. Quartile Values (hours)
Model I
Model II
Model III
Model IV

55

50%
69.336
61.302
71.431
63.660

25%
68.5
60.4
70.1
62.9

60

65

Hours
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Figure 7. Model Probability Density Functions
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75%
70.2
62.2
72.8
64.4
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Summary
This chapter presented the results of statistical analysis accomplished on
simulation model output. Additionally, the verification efforts used for model
development were discussed. The results discussed above lead to the conclusions
presented in Chapter V. Recommendations for future research are also discussed in
Chapter V.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction
This chapter concludes this study of the Air Expeditionary Wing responsiveness
capability. First, the original research questions are revisited. Next, the conclusions
reached for each of the research questions is discussed. The observations gained
throughout the research effort are detailed with respect to Air Force implications. The
tenth step of sound modeling and simulation, implementation, is briefly discussed.
Throughout this chapter, limitations to this study are presented. Finally,
recommendations for future researchers are provided.

Conclusions
Each of the four research questions from Chapter I is now restated and addressed
based on the information contained in Chapters II through IV.
1. What key events represent the critical path for the first 72 hours of an AEW
deployment timeline?
In Chapter II, a review of past AEF deployments was accomplished. This review
provided a framework for the assumptions presented in Chapter III. The assumptions
were used to isolate the key events comprising the critical path during the first 72 hours
of an AEW deployment. Expert consultation was used to develop the assumptions,
identify deployment timeline key events, and approximate the key event distribution
times. The key events were common to each AMC airlifter transporting personnel and
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equipment to the deployed location. Each of the key events used in this study were listed
and defined within Chapter III.
The assumptions made in Chapter III were necessary to limit the scope of this
study. The discussion of each assumption details dissenting opinions proffered by some
planning experts consulted. In each case, justification for making the assumption was
given. Collectively the assumptions are limitations to this research effort. As stated, the
assumptions were used to identify those events which comprise the critical path of the
AEW deployment timeline. Therefore, changes in assumptions may lead to the
identification of new key events, and the development of a completely different
simulation model. The key events identified in this study were: recall, crew rest, mission
brief/preflight, aircraft loading, aircraft unloading, ground time, and flight time. In
addition, constant duration times were used for fighter regeneration and fighter flight
time-to-target. These times were not included in the simulation model; however, they
were considered during the final analysis accomplished in Chapter IV.
The conceptual model used to develop the simulation model in this study was
documented in the form of a process flow diagram (See Figures 3 through 6, Chapter III).
The process flow diagram as well as the resulting simulation model attempted to model
each of the 13 AMC aircraft. In order to actually run the model, distributions for the
duration of each deployment key event time were approximated.
2. What are the approximated distributions for each of the key events in the deployment
timeline?
The triangular distribution was used to approximate many of the key event times.
Times were approximated through consultation with experts or in some cases by
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referencing Air Force instructions. Flight times were approximated using the Joint Flow
and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) flight time calculator. The actual
parameters for approximated key event distributions may be found in Tables 5 and 6.
The absence of actual data for the key event times required the utilization of the
triangular distribution for simulation modeling; however, the lack of actual data is also a
serious limitation to this study. Although experts provided the parameters (optimistic,
pessimistic, and most likely times) for key event probability distributions, the actual key
event times may adhere to a different distribution altogether. It is this researcher's
opinion that parameters for actual key event time distributions are more pessimistic than
those used in this study. Utilization of more pessimistic distribution parameters would
increase the variance of each of the key event distributions. Furthermore, if the key event
time durations are more pessimistic in reality than the actual probabilities for completing
an AEW in 72 hours are less than indicated by this study.
3. What is the current probability for completing an AEW in 72 hours?
Research questions three and four were addressed through the use of simulation.
The calculated probability for completing an AEW in 72 hours or less was approximately
zero. Output from 150 runs of Model I was normally distributed. The 72-hour criterion
(adjusted to 63 hours) fell almost five standard deviations below the estimated mean of
the approximated normal distribution. The Empirical rule states that "approximately
99.7% (essentially all) of the measurements fall within 3 standard deviations of the
mean" (34:70). This conclusion was based upon the assumptions and key event times
identified in Chapter III, as well as the conceptual and simulation models discussed in
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Chapters III and IV. Model I was treated as a baseline model from which alterations
were made in order to address research question four.
4. What are the new probabilities for completing an AEW given changes in conceptual
model assumptions to include: throughput capacity (i.e., increase in working
maximum-on-ground), maintenance downtime due to airlift failures, and
accomplishment of air-to-air refueling for all deploying airlifters?
The throughput capacity and air-refueling aspects of this research question were
developed from ongoing work being accomplished by members of the 366 WG AEW
working-group at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. Colonel Gail Duke, Commander 366
Logistics Group, and AEW working-group chairperson, was interviewed for this thesis.
The AEW working-group is working to ensure that the 366 rapid-response AEW can
meet the 72-hour criterion. Many of the AEW working-group assumptions for AEW
deployments were not completely in-line with the assumptions made for the baseline
model. The differences in assumptions and justification for those differences are
discussed in Chapter III.
One method for increasing AEW responsiveness capability is by increasing the
airlift throughput capacity. Although the working MOG at Mountain Home AFB is
currently two, Model II simulates an increase in the throughput capacity to a working
MOG of four at both Mountain Home AFB and the deployed location. A new airflow
was designed to accommodate this increase in throughput capability. The probability for
completing an AEW in 72 hours or less for this second scenario was approximately 90%.
The 72-hour criterion (adjusted to 63 hours) fell approximately 1.28 standard deviations
above the estimated mean of the approximated normal distribution.
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One difference between the assumptions made in the baseline model, and those
proffered by the AEW working-group at Mt. Home was the air-refueling scenario. AEW
working-group planners at Mt. Home accept this assumption; however, planners
interviewed from HQ AMC did not concur with this assumption. Model IV incorporated
the AEW working-group assumption, thus simulating air-refueling for all deploying
airlifters. This departure from the baseline model acts as another method for increasing
the responsiveness capability of the AEW. The probability of meeting the 72-hour
criterion was greater for Model IV, approximately 28%, than Model I; however,
responsiveness capability was less than Model II.
The probability distribution resulting from 150 runs of Model III had the largest
mean of the four models. This was the only simulation model to incorporate failures of
airlifters. Failures only occurred during ground times at enroute locations. The ground
time for each airlifter was a result of sampling from a distribution with a range of 2-7.15
hours. The probability of the AEW represented by Model III of meeting the 72-hour
criterion was approximated to be zero. The mean for this probability distribution was
4.29 standard deviations above the 72-hour criterion (adjusted to 63 hours).
This study did not address any plans for increasing working MOG at either
Mountain Home AFB or the deployed location.

Implications and Limitations
General Ryan's recent announcement of his intentions to evolve the current Air
Force to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) brought credibility to USCENTAF's
AEF concept (41). Along with 10 Air Expeditionary Forces the EAF concept will
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include two on-call, rapid-response Air Expeditionary Wings. The on-call AEW
capability at Mountain Home AFB, the subject of this study, is currently developing their
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for meeting a 72-hour criterion. The capability of the
on-call AEW is multi-dimensional. Two general capabilities of the AEW were discussed
in this study. The first, mission capability, was briefly discussed in Chapters I and II.
The mission capability of an AEW is a function of the sum of Unit Type Code
mission capabilities. The mission capability of an AEW is quantified in order to fulfill
supported Commander-in-Chief (CINC) requirements. Quantification of mission
capability seeks to answer CINC questions such as: How much air superiority does an
AEW give me? This study sought to assess another CINC capability-based question: How
long will it take? The answer to this question was termed responsiveness capability for
the purposes of this research. As stated, the current CONOPS requires that the AEW has
the responsiveness capability necessary to establish operational effect (put bombs on
target) in 72 hours or less. The combination of these two capabilities, mission and
responsiveness, has led the Air Force to define the AEF/AEW as a flexible deterrent
option (FDO). In fact, the AEF/AEW has been likened to another flexible deterrent
option, the carrier battle group.
The responsiveness capability of a carrier battle group is easily quantified as
being a function of distance from the fight. Additionally, the carrier battle group has
been used frequently in crisis response to project power or to gain forward presence.
Conversely, the stated AEF/AEW responsiveness capability has yet to be stringently
tested. This study assumed a worst-case crisis scenario in which the supported CINC
bypasses all phases of crisis action planning. In this case, an AEW may be required to
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deploy with no-notice. According to the results of the baseline simulation model, an
AEW would not meet the 72-hour criterion under the assumptions stated in Chapter III.
Furthermore, when the air-refueling option is incorporated into Model IV the 72-hour
criterion is met only 28% of the time. This implies that the Air Force is currently touting
an inaccurate responsiveness capability to potential crisis response decision-makers such
as CINC USCENTCOM, National Command Authority, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
This study provided an example of one method for increasing the responsiveness
capability of the AEW. A change in one assumption, the airlift throughput capacity,
resulted in a 90% probability of an AEW meeting the 72-hour criterion. However, the
resulting probability distributions and therefore the probability statements for Models I,
II, and IV should be recognized as very forgiving towards completing the AEW in 72
hours given the worst-case no-notice scenario. The simulation models developed for this
study are low fidelity due to the many complexities excluded. This was evidenced when
one of the simplifying assumptions, no failures, was modified in Model III. The result, of
course, was an increase in the dependent variable, mean time to complete the deployment
of the initial combat capability. A more robust model incorporating additional fog and
friction factors such as aircraft/mechanical failures, delays in information flow,
miscommunications, personnel issues, and many other sources of delay may result in
large increases to the dependent variable. Therefore, the mean of the respective
probability distributions should be viewed as the minimum amount of time necessary to
complete an actual AEW due to the limitations of the simulation models.
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Based on input from experts in the field, this study was approached from a
standpoint that AMC airlift is a resource constraint. This is a limiting factor for the
response capability of the AEW when the initial combat capability (ICC) assumption
described in Chapter III is considered. The results of this study may be discounted if this
assumption is deemed unnecessary; however, the assumption that a certain amount of
equipment and personnel must be in place before the fighter aircraft arrive was based on
the CONOPS of each of the past seven AEF deployments. The improvement gained
from changing the working-MOG constraint and the air-refueling assumption allowed
improvements in the dependent variable, hours required for entire ICC movement. This
implies that the Air Force may be able to determine where gains may be made in
responsiveness capability by utilizing simulation methods. However, models with higher
fidelity than those developed in this research are required in order to gain insight into the
marginal utility of resource/policy changes on the responsiveness capability of the AEW.
The conclusions of this study were congruent with the results of a recently
published article in the Air Force Journal of Logistics. Researchers from Rand
corporation in cooperation with the Air Force Logistics Management Agency stated that
in order to meet the deployment timeline criteria people must be deployed or material
must be at an advanced state of preparation at the deployed location (45:38). This
category-1 base defined in this article, A Global Infrastructure to Support EAF, was
equal in capabilities to the warm-base used in this simulation. The equity in capabilities
was achieved through the assumptions enumerated in Chapter III.
The tenth step of modeling and simulation is implementation. In this case,
implementation would entail Air Force actions directed towards increasing the working
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maximum-on-ground at Mountain Home AFB as well as the deployed location or
ensuring that air-refueling is available for the initial AEW airlifters. This study, due to its
exploratory nature, does not seek to make recommendations to that end. Instead,
implementation should take the form of using simulations models such as the one utilized
in this study to evaluate the effects of policy alternatives on AEW responsiveness
capabilities. Policy alternatives may include decisions to increase fiscal spending on
resources such as materials handling equipment or accelerated acquisition of the Air
Force's newest airlifter, the C-17. Additionally, policy alternatives could entail changing
the management philosophy of current resources by increasing readiness levels or repositioning of war reserve materiel. Policy changes must be evaluated as to their costs
and benefits. Simulation modeling is one tool for conducting such analysis.
One observation made during the qualitative portion of this research revealed that
the initial AEW deployment is constrained in several different ways. Therefore
improvements in one area may not decrease the overall time required to deploy the initial
combat capability of the AEW. For example, an actual deployment of an AEW may see
the working maximum-on-ground constraint improved from two to four, but diplomatic
clearances not granted until 48 hours after the Warning Order. This example may be
applied to other constraints such as, airlift/refueling tanker availability, prepositioned
equipment, aircrew initial response, parking maximum-on-ground, fueling maximum-onground, host nation support, and aircraft reliabilities. This implies that implementation of
policies designed to increase AEW responsive capability must be evaluated with respect
to all of these possible constraining factors.
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Recommendations to Future Researchers
Several areas surfaced during the course of this study, which lend themselves to
follow-on research. The first of these deals with the crucial issue of improving the
validity of the model. In order to quantify the exact response capability of the AEW the
simulation model must be expanded. Secondly, assuming the development of a more
robust and valid model, sensitivity analysis may be performed to assess the effects of
changes to model inputs on the dependent variable (the time required to deploy the initial
combat capability of the AEW). Finally, cost-benefit analysis of alternatives to
improving AEW response capability should be accomplished prior to actually
implementing policy changes.
Improvements to model validity, the first area for future research, may be
accomplished by several different methods. The simplifying assumptions made to
develop the model Used in this study may be corrected in a more robust model. One
simplifying assumption that could be modeled is mechanical failure of both the AMC
aircraft as well as the failure rates of the fighter aircraft. Although Model III
incorporated a probability of AMC aircraft failure at the enroute locations, a higher
fidelity model would allow for aircraft failures and corresponding repair to occur at any
point on the timeline. An expanded model may also attempt to incorporate probabilities
associated with obtaining diplomatic clearance or overfly rights in a certain number of
hours. Finally, future researchers may develop a model with key event time probability
distribution parameters that have been approximated from actual deployment data rather
than through use of personal interviews and the triangular distribution.
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Future researchers should conduct sensitivity analysis in order to ascertain the
effects of varying policy alternatives on AEW response improvements. Ideally, it would
behoove future researchers to isolate the model inputs, which when changed, result in the
largest improvements to the time required to deploy the AEW's initial combat capability.
This study recommends analysis of several policy alternatives and the corresponding
changes to simulation model inputs. One option would be to decrease the number of
airlifters required due to increases in prepositioned war reserve materiel. Another would
be to model a direct flight of varying levels of AMC airlift rather than abiding by the
assumption incorporated into Model IV, that all deploying airlifters are air-refueled.
Additional analysis could also be accomplished on varying levels of the working
maximum-on-ground constraint due to acquisition of new materials handling equipment
such as the Tunner loader. Sensitivity analysis could also be done to evaluate the effects
of different mixes and orders of the airlift schedule. Finally, sensitivity analysis should
be accomplished with regard to determining marginal utility of changes to model inputs,
as previously mentioned. Researchers must quantify the effect of unit changes in model
inputs to unit changes in the dependent variable, hours.
Detailed sensitivity analysis is not sufficient for making the optimum
policy/resource decisions. In addition to developing a more valid model and
accomplishing sensitivity analysis future researchers need to perform cost-benefit
analysis. This study has presented the benefit, increased response capability, due to
increases in the working maximum-on-ground constraint and inclusion of the airrefueling scenario. An extension to this study may perform cost-benefit analysis by
determining the costs of increasing the working maximum-on-ground at Mountain Home
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AFB and the deployed location. Similarly, a cost may be quantified for maintaining the
AMC readiness levels required to ensure that a tanker bridge is in place for the AEW.
Hypothetical^, Air Force decision-makers may not be willing to commit to spending $20
million to increase the working MOG in order to improve the response time of the AEW
by only seven hours. Cost-benefit analysis may be conducted on any of those areas
mentioned in the sensitivity analysis recommendations.

Summary
The present study attempted to quantify the response capability of the AEW.
Although seven AEF deployments have been accomplished in the Southwest Asia area of
responsibility, none have met the stringent 72-hour criterion. Despite the inability of past
AEF deployments to meet this criterion Air Force leadership maintains that the rapidresponse AEW has the capability to meet this criterion. Simulation modeling has not
been employed in past research to model the deployment process of an AEW in the first
72 hours. As such, many assumptions were necessary in order to develop the simulation
models for this exploratory research. While necessary, these assumptions acted as a
hindrance to model validity and fidelity. Analysis of results from the baseline AEW
simulation model allowed this study to conclude that the AEW did not have the capability
to meet the 72-hour criterion.
Additionally, this study examined the effect of three departures from the baseline
model on responsiveness capability. These departures included: increasing airlift
throughput capacity, incorporating limited airlift failure, and employing an air-refueling
scenario. Based on the simulation model incorporating the increased airlift throughput
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capacity, it was concluded that the AEW could meet the 72-hour criterion 90% of the
time. The air-refueling simulation scenario met the 72-hour criterion 28% of the time.
Finally, it was concluded that inclusion of potential downtime for AMC airlifters resulted
in an AEW simulation model not capable of meeting the 72-hour criterion. The
limitations of this study were discussed in the context of both the results and their
implications, and future research was suggested towards quantifying policy/resource
alternatives to assist senior Air Force decision-makers.
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Appendix A: Acronyms

AB

Air Base

ACC

Air Combat Command

ADA

Air Defense Artillery

AEF

Air Expeditionary Force

AEW

Air Expeditionary Wing

AFB

Air Force Base

AFIT

Air Force Institute of Technology

AFP

Air Force Pamphlet

AMC

Air Mobility Command

AOR

Area of Responsibility

BPPBS

Biennial Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

CAP

Crisis Action Planning

CINC

Commander in Chief

CJCS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA

Course of Action

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

CONPLAN

Concept Plan

CONUS

Continental United States

CPA

Chairman's Program Assessment

DOD

Department of Defense

DPG

Defense Planning Guidance
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EAF

Expeditionary Aerospace Force

FDO

Flexible Deterrent Option

FG

Fighter Group

FW

Fighter Wing

FYDP

Future Years Defense Plan

HARM

High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

HTS

HARM Targeting System

HQ

Headquarters

ICC

Initial Combat Capability

IDO

Installation Deployment Officer

IG

Inspector General

ISPA

Initial Strike Package Airlift

JFACC

Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFAST

Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation

JOPES

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JPD

Joint Planning Document

JPEC

Joint Planning and Execution Community

JSCP

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOG

Joint Strategic Officer's Guide

JSPS

Joint Strategic Planning System

JSR

Joint Strategy Review

MHE

Materiel Handling Equipment

MISCAPS

Mission Capability Statements
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MOG

Maximum-on-ground

MRE

Meals ready-to-eat

NAVAIDS

Navigational Aids

NCA

National Command Authority

NMCC

National Military Command Center

NMS

National Military Strategy

NOTAM

Notice to Airmen

NSCS

National Security Council System

NSS

National Security Strategy

OPLAN

Operational Plan

OPORD

Operation Order

PDM

Program Decision Memorandum

POL

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

POM

Program Objective Memorandum

RDD

Required Delivery Dates

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

SWA

Southwest Asia

TALCE

Tanker Air Lift Control Elements

TPFDD

Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

USCENTAF

United States Central Air Force

USCENTCOM

United States Central Command

USTRANSCOM

United States Transportation Command
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UTC

Unit Type Code

WMP

War and Mobilization Plan

WRM

War Reserve Materiel
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Appendix B: Glossary of Terms
Area of Responsibility: The geographical area associated with a combatant command
within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.
bare base: A base having a runway, taxiway(s), and parking area(s) which are adequate
for the deployed force and possessing an adequate source of water that can be potable.
Commander in Chief: The terms "unified commander" and "specified commander"
refers to commands established by the President as combatant commands under Section
161, United States Code. The acronym "CINC" refers to the commander of such a
command.
crisis action planning: (DOD) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in
response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action
procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame
permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment,
and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to
a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their
plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. See
also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.
concept of operations: (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a
commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The
concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in
the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be
carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall
picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also
called commander's concept.
course of action: (DOD) 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the
accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It
is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development
phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the
commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of
operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an
integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support
forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time
available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action
becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order Also
called COA.
deliberate planning: (DOD) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in
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joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate
planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of
Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic
Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of
apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation.
Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will
exist when the plan is executed. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.
deterrent options: (DOD) A course of action, developed on the best economic,
diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a
current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a
range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring
deployment of forces should be a separate force module.)
Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). The EAF concept is how the Air Force will
organize, train, equip, and sustain itself by creating a mindset and cultural state that
embraces the unique characteristics of aerospace power - range, speed, flexibility,
precision - to meet the national security challenges of the 21st century.
execute order: (DOD) 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National
Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate
military operations as directed.
flexible deterrent option: (DOD) A planning construct intended to facilitate early
decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with
deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. The Flexible
Deterrent Option is the means by which the various deterrent options available to a
commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures) are
implemented into the planning process. Also called FDO. See also deterrent options.
force module: (DOD) A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service
support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and
personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force
modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from
or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases
to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. Also called
FM. See also force module package.
Force Package. A Force Package is the basic unit designator of a unit type code (UTC)
and is used as a planning tool to tailor an AEF.
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System: A continuously evolving system
that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and
execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It
97

provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theaterlevel commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the
conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures
supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to
monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment
activities associated with j oint operations. Also called JOPES.
Lead Unit: MAJCOMs designate a lead unit when the AEF forces placed on-call come
from more than one location. The Lead Unit works closely with the parent MAJCOM
who directs the planning and coordination efforts of designated AEF units to determine
operational, logistics, and support requirements to meet mission objectives.
Maximum-on-Ground: The maximum number of aircraft that can be accommodated at
one time at a specific location due to limitations of ramp space, servicing capabilities,
cargo handling, or other considerations (MOG).
Mission Support Teams (MSTs): MSTs are smaller TALCE-like organizations that are
generally capable of the same support TALCEs provide, only on a much smaller scale.
They are generally led by a non-commissioned officer and provide a level of C2, aerial
port, and maintenance services capable of supporting MOG of one aircraft.
Pre-Positioning: Pre-positioning refers to movements that take place prior to receipt of
a CJCS Warning/Alert Order. Pre-positioning normally refers to equipment and supplies.
Exception: The HQ AMC TACC commander may (pre)position air refueling forces
(aircraft and crews) in anticipation of a Warning/Alert Order. Depending on the nature of
the contingency, this will facilitate the timely movement of other positioning/deploying
forces.
Reachback: This capability allows commanders to obtain or coordinate support from
units not physically located with the forward force. By leveraging advances in
communications technology, reachback capabilities make it possible to utilize CONUS
and/or rear-based assets and organizations to perform various functions in support of
AEF operations. Effective use of reachback will reduce the number of personnel and
amount of equipment which deploys to the AOR, reduce airlift and support requirements,
and will positively impact a commander's ability to protect the deployed force.
Reachback is predicated on global communications, rapid global mobility, and timedefinite resupply capabilities.
Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCE): A TALCE is a deployable C2
organization responsible for providing continuous on-site management of mobility
airfield operations. It is a provisional organization composed of various mission support
elements (MSE). TALCEs provide command, control, and communications, aerial port,
logistics, maintenance, security, weather, medical, and intelligence services, as necessary.
TALCEs are tailored based on projected requirements. TALCE's are designed to provide
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immediate response capabilities in support of the deployment phase of a contingency.
For sustainment operations, personnel sourced from mobility units should replace the
TALCE. The TALCE then redeploys and reconstitutes for follow-on taskings.
time-phased force and deployment data: The Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, nonunit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan,
including: a. In-place units, b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a
priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation, c.
Routing of forces to be deployed, d. Movement data associated with deploying forces, e.
Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted
concurrently with the deployment of forces, f. Estimate of transportation requirements
that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that
can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. See
also time-phased force and deployment data maintenance; time-phased force and
deployment data refinement; time-phased force and deployment list.
times: (DOD) (C-, D-, M-däys end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are
assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified
and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be
established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface
movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.
C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or
is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo,
weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types
of transport.
L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation
commences or is to commence.
D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is
to commence.
H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation
commences.
unit type code: (DOD) A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies
each type unit of the Armed Forces. Also called UTC
warning order: (DOD) A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a
supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted.
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war reserves: (DOD, NATO) Stocks of materiel amassed in peacetime to meet the
increase in military requirements consequent upon an outbreak of war. War reserves are
intended to provide the interim support essential to sustain operations until resupply can
be effected.
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Appendix C: AWESIM Program Code

Model I
1 GEN,," AEF", 19Jun, 150, YES,YES;
2 LIMITS„„2;
3 INITIALIZE,0.0,45000,YES;
4 NETWORK,READ;
5 FIN;
1 RESOURCE,3,Daharan,4,{3};
2 RESOURCE,2,Moron,6,{2};
3 RESOURCE, 1 ,Mt_Home,4, {1};
4RESOURCE,4,Load,2,{4};
5 RESOURCE,5,Unload,2,{5};
6CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
7 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
8Takeoffl:GOON,l;
9 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
10ALTER,2,-1,1;
11 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
12ALTER,2,+i,l;
13 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
14CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
15 ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(l,2,4)+15,,,,"Notify Crews";
16Takeoff2:GOON,l;
17 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(7.3,7.8,8.3);
18ALTER,2,-1,1;
19 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
20ALTER,2,+1,1;
21 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
22CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
23 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
24Takeofß:GOON,l;
25 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
26ALTER,2,-1,1;
27 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
28ALTER,2,+1,1;
29ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5)„"SecForc";
30 SecForc: ALTER,3,-1,1;
31 ACTIVITY;
32 AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
33 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
34FREE,{{5,1}},1;
35 ACTIVITY;
36ALTER,3,+1,1;
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37 ACTIVITY„,,"terminate";
38CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
39 ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notiry Crews";
40Takeoff4:GOON,l;
41 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
42ALTER,2,-1,1;
43 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
44ALTER,2,+1,1;
45ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5),,"TALCE";
46TALCE:ALTER,3,-1,1;
47 ACTIVITY;
48 AWAiT„{{5,l}},ALL,,N0NE,l;
49 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
50FREE,{{5,1}},1;
51 ACTIVITY;
52ALTER,3,+1,1;
53 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
54 CREATE,8,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
55 ACTIVITY,, 16„„"Notify Crews";
56AWAIT„{{l,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
57 ACTIVITY;
58FREE,{{1,1}},1;
59 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
60 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
61 ACTIVITY;
62 AWAIT,, {{4,1}} ,ALL„NONE, 1;
63 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,4.25,5.25);
64FREE,{{4,1}},1;
65 ACTIVITY;
66ALTER,1,+1,1;
67 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalkl 59";
68 Chalk 159: GOON, 1;
69 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
70 AWAIT„{{2,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
71 ACTIVITY;
72FREE,{{2,1}},1;
73 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
74ALTER,2,-1,1;
75 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
76 AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
77 ACTIVITY;
78FREE,{{3,1}},1;
79 ACTIVITY;
80ALTER,2,+1,1;
81 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
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82ALTER,3,-U;
83 ACTIVITY„„"Chalkl59cont";
84 Chalkl59cont: AWAIT„{{5,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
85 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
86FREE,{{5,1}},1;
87 ACTIVITY;
88ALTER,3,+1,1;
89 ACTIVITY„,,"terminateM;
90 CREATE,2,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
91 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
92 AWAIT,, {{1,1}}, ALL„NONE, 1;
93 ACTIVITY;
94FREE,{{1,1}},1;
95 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
96 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
97 ACTIVITY;
98 AWAIT,, {{4,1}},ALL„NONE, 1;
99 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
100FREE,{{4,1}},1;
101 ACTIVITY;
102ALTER,1,+1,1;
103 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalk234";
104 Chalk234: GOON, 1;
105 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
106 AWAIT,, {{2,1 }},ALL„NONE,l;
107 ACTIVITY;
108FREE.{{2,1}},1;
109 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
110ALTER,2,-1,1;
111 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
112 AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
113 ACTIVITY;
114FREE,{{3,1}},1;
INACTIVITY;
116ALTER,2,+1,1;
117 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
118ALTER,3,-1,1;
119 ACTIVITY„„MChalk234cont";
120 Chalk234cont: AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
121 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
122FREE,{{5,1}},1;
123 ACTIVITY;
124ALTER,3,+1,1;
125 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
126CREATE,2,10„3,1;
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127 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
128 AWAIT„{{1,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
129 ACTIVITY;
130FREE,{{1,1}},1;
131 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
132ALTER,1,-1,1;
133 ACTIVITY;
134 AWAIT„{{4,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
135ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
136FREE,{{4,1}},1;
137 ACTIVITY;
138ALTER,1,+1,1;
139ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalk678";
140Chalk678:GOON,l;
141 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
142 AWAIT„{{2,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
143 ACTIVITY;
144FREE,{{2,1}},1;
145 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
146ALTER,2,-1,1;
147 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
148 AWAIT„{{3,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
149 ACTIVITY;
150FREE,{{3,1}},1;
151 ACTIVITY;
152ALTER,2,+1,1;
153 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
154ALTER,3,-1,1;
155 ACTIVITY„„"Chalk678cont";
156 Chalk678cont: AWAIT,,{{5,1 }},ALL„N0NE,1;
157 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
158FREE,{{5,1}},1;
159 ACTIVITY;
160ALTER,3,+1,1;
161 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
162 terminate: G00N,1;
163 ACTIVITY;
164COLCT„TNOW,„„l;
165 ACTIVITY;
166 TERMINATE, 13;
Model II
1 GEN„"AEF",19Jun,150,YES,YES;
2 LIMITS„„2;
3 INITIALIZE,0.0,45000,YES;
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4 NETWORK,READ;
5 FIN;
1 RESOURCE,5,Unload,4,{5};
2 RESOURCE,4,Load,4,{4};
3 RESOURCE,l,Mt_Home,5,{l};
4 RESOURCE,2,Moron,6,{2};
5 RESOURCE,3,Daharan,5,{3};
6CREATE,INF,0.0„U;
7 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
8Takeoffl:GOON,l;
9 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
10ALTER,2,-1,1;
11 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
12ALTER,2,+1,1;
13 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
14CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
15 ACTIVITY,JRIAG(l,2,4)+15,,,,"Notify Crews";
16Takeoff2:GOON,l;
17 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(7.3,7.8,8.3);
18ALTER,2,-1,1;
19 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3-25);
20ALTER,2,+1,1;
21 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
22CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
23 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
24Takeoff3:GOON,l;
25 ACTIVITY,JRIAG(6,6.5,7);
26ALTER,2,-1,1;
27 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
28ALTER,2,+1,1;
29ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5)„"SecForc";
30 SecForc: ALTER,3,-1,1;
31 ACTIVITY;
32 AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
33 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
34FREE,{{5,1}},1;
35 ACTIVITY;
36ALTER,3,+1,1;
37 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
38CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
39 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notiry Crews";
40Takeoff4:GOON,l;
41 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
42ALTER,2,-1,1;
43 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
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44ALTER,2,+1,1;
45ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5),,MTALCE";
46TALCE:ALTER,3,-1,1;
47 ACTIVITY;
48 AWAIT„{{5,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
49 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
50FREE,{{5,1}},1;
51 ACTIVITY;
52ALTER,3,+1,1;
53 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
54 CREATE,4,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
55 ACTIVITY,, 16„„"Notify Crews";
56AWAIT,,{{l,l}},ALL,,NONE,l;
57 ACTIVITY;
58FREE,{{1,1}},1;
59 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
60 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
61 ACTIVITY;
62 AWAIT„{{4,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
63 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,4.25,5.25);
64FREE,{{4,1}},1;
65 ACTIVITY;
66ALTER,1,+1,1;
67 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalkl 59";
68Chalkl59:GOON,l;
69 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
70 AWAIT,, {{2,1 }},ALL„NONE,l;
71 ACTIVITY;
72FREE,{{2,1}},1;
73 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
74ALTER,2,-1,1;
75 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
76 AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
77 ACTIVITY;
78FREE,{{3,1}},1;
79 ACTIVITY;
80ALTER,2,+1,1;
81 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
82ALTER,3,-1,1;
83 ACTIVITY„„"Chalkl59cont";
84 Chalkl59cont: AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
85 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
86FREE,{{5,1}},1;
87 ACTIVITY;
88ALTER,3,+1,1;
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89 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
90 CREATE, 1,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
91 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
92 AWAIT,, {{1,1}}, ALL„NONE, 1;
93 ACTIVITY;
94FREE,{{1,1}},1;
95 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
96 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
97 ACTIVITY;
98 AWAIT,, {{4,1} },ALL„NONE,l;
99 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
100FREE,{{4,1}},1;
101 ACTIVITY;
102ALTER,1,+1,1;
103ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(4,4.5,5),,"Chalk234";
104 Chalk234: GOON, 1;
105 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
106 AWAIT„{{2,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
107 ACTIVITY;
108FREE,{{2,1}},1;
109 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
110ALTER,2,-1,1;
111 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
112 AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
113 ACTIVITY;
114FREE,{{3,1}},1;
INACTIVITY;
116ALTER,2,+1,1;
117 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
118ALTER,3,-1,1;
119 ACTIVITY„„"Chalk234cont,,;
120 Chalk234cont: AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
121 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
122FREE,{{5,1}},1;
123 ACTIVITY;
124ALTER,3,+1,1;
125 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
126CREATE,1,5„3,1;
127 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
128 AWAIT„{{l,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
129 ACTIVITY;
130FREE,{{1,1}},1;
131 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
132ALTER,1,-1,1;
133 ACTIVITY;
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134 AWAIT„{{4,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
135ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
136FREE,{{4,1}},1;
137 ACTIVITY;
138ALTER,1,+1,1;
139ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalk678";
140 Chalk678: GOON, 1;
141 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
142 AWAIT,,{{2,1 }},ALL„NONE,l;
143 ACTIVITY;
144FREE,{{2,1}},1;
145 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
146ALTER,2,-1,1;
147 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,4);
148 AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
149 ACTIVITY;
150FREE,{{3,1}},1;
151 ACTIVITY;
152ALTER,2,+1,1;
153 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
154ALTER,3,-1,1;
155 ACTIVITY„„MChalk678cont";
156 Chalk678cont: AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l:
157 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
158FREE,{{5,1}},1;
159 ACTIVITY;
160ALTER,3,+1,1;
161 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
162 terminate: GOON, 1;
163 ACTIVITY;
164COLCT„TNOW,„„l;
165. ACTIVITY;
166 TERMINATE, 13;
Model HI
1 GEN„*AEF",19Jun,150,YES,YES;
2 LIMITS„„2;
3 INITIALIZE,0.0,45000,YES;
4 NETWORK,READ;
5 FIN;
1 RESOURCE,5,Unload,2,{5};
2 RESOURCE,4,Load,2,{4};
3 RESOURCE, 1 ,Mt_Home,4, {1};
4 RESOURCE,2,Moron,6,{2};
5 RESOURCES,Daharan,4,{3};
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6CREATE,INF,0.0„U;
7 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
8Takeoffl:GOON,l;
9 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
10ALTER,2,-1,1;
11 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
12ALTER,2,+1,1;
13 ACTIVITY„„"terminateM;
14CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
15 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+15„„MNotiry Crews";
16Takeoff2:GOON,l;
17ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(7.3,7.8,8.3);
18ALTER,2,-1,1;
19 ACTIVITY„TRIAG( 1.75,2.25,3.25);
20ALTER,2,+1,1;
21 ACTIVITY,„,"terminate";
22CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
23 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notiry Crews";
24Takeofß:GOON,l;
25 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
26ALTER,2,-1,1;
27 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
28ALTER,2,+1,1;
29ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5)„"SecForc";
30 SecForc: ALTER,3,-1,1;
31 ACTIVITY;
32 AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
33 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
34FREE,{{5,1}},1;
35 ACTIVITY;
36ALTER,3,+1,1;
37 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
38CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
39 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
40Takeoff4:GOON,l;
41 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
42ALTER,2,-1,1;
43 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
44ALTER,2,+1,1;
45ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5)„"TALCE";
46TALCE:ALTER,3,-1,1;
47 ACTIVITY;
48 AWAIT,, {{5,1 }},ALL„NONE,l;
49 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
50FREE,{{5,1}},1;
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51 ACTIVITY;
52ALTER,3,+1,1;
53 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
54 CREATE,8,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
55 ACTIVITY,, 16„„"Notify Crews";
56 AWAIT„{{1,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
57 ACTIVITY;
58FREE,{{1,1}},1;
59 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
60 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
61 ACTIVITY;
62 AWAIT,, {{4,1}}, ALL„NONE, 1;
63 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,4.25,5.25);
64FREE,{{4,1}},1;
65 ACTIVITY;
66 ALTER, 1,+1,1;
67ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalkl59";
68Chalkl59:GOON,l;
69 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
70 AWAIT,,{{2,1 }},ALL„NONE,l;
71 ACTIVITY;
72FREE,{{2,1}},1;
73 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
74ALTER,2,-1,1;
75 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
76 AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
77 ACTIVITY;
78FREE,{{3,1}},1;
79 ACTIVITY;
80ALTER,2,+1,1;
81 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
82ALTER,3,-1,1;
83 ACTIVITY„„"Chalkl59cont";
84 Chalkl59cont: AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
85 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
86FREE,{{5,1}},1;
87 ACTIVITY;
88ALTER,3,+1,1;
89 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
90 CREATE,2,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
91 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
92AWAIT„{{l,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
93 ACTIVITY;
94FREE,{{1,1}},1;
95 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
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96 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
97 ACTIVITY;
98 AWAIT,, {{4,1}} ,ALL„NONE, 1;
99 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
100FREE,{{4,1}},1;
101 ACTIVITY;
102 ALTER, 1,+1,1;
103 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„"Chalk234";
104Chalk234:GOON,l;
105 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
106 AWAIT„{{2,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
107 ACTIVITY;
108FREE,{{2,1}},1;
109 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
110ALTER,2,-1,1;
111 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
112AWAIT„{{3,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
113 ACTIVITY;
114FREE,{{3,1}},1;
115 ACTIVITY;
116ALTER,2,+1,1;
117 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5):
118ALTER,3,-1,1;
119 ACTIVITY„„"Chalk234cont";
120 Chalk234cont: AWAIT,,{{5,1 }},ALL„NONE,l;
121 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
122FREE,{{5,1}},1;
123 ACTIVITY;
124ALTER,3,+1,1;
125 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
126CREATE,2,10„3,1;
127 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
128 AWAIT„{{l,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
129 ACTIVITY;
130FREE,{{1,1}},1;
131 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
132ALTER,1,-1,1;
133 ACTIVITY;
134 AWAIT„{{4,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
135ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
136FREE,{{4,1}},1;
137 ACTIVITY;
138ALTER,1,+1,1;
139 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5)„,,Chalk678";
140 Chalk678: GOON, 1;
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141 AdTVITY„TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
142 AWAIT„{{2,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
143 ACTIVITY;
144FREE,{{2,1}},1;
145 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
146ALTER,2,-1,1;
147ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(2,3,7.15);
148 AWAIT„{{3,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
149 ACTIVITY;
150FREE,{{3,1}},1;
151 ACTIVITY;
152ALTER,2,+1,1;
153 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(5.5,6,6.5);
154ALTER,3,-1,1;
155 ACTIVITY„„,,Chalk678cont";
156 Chalk678cont: AWAIT„{{5,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
157 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
158FREE,{{5,1}},1;
159 ACTIVITY;
160ALTER,3,+1,1;
161 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
162 terminate: GOON, 1;
163 ACTIVITY;
164COLCT„TNOW,„„l;
165 ACTIVITY;
166 TERMINATE, 13;
Model IV
1 GEN„MAEF",19Jun,150,YES,YES;
2 LIMITS„„2;
3 INITIALIZE,0.0,45000,YES;
4 NETWORK,READ;
5 FIN;
1 RESOURCE,5,Unload,2,{5};
2 RESOURCE,4,Load,2,{4};
3 RESOURCE,l,Mt_Home,4,{l};
4 RESOURCE,2,Moron,6,{2};
5 RESOURCE,3,Daharan,4,{3};
6CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
7 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notiry Crews";
8Takeoffl:GOON,l;
9 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(6,6.5,7);
10ALTER,2,-1,1;
11 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
12ALTER,2,+1,1;
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13 ACTIVITY,,,,"terminate";
14CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
15 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+15„„"Notify Crews";
16Takeoff2:GOON,l;
17 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(7.3,7.8,8.3);
18ALTER,2,-1,1;
19 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
20ALTER,2,+1,1;
21 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
22CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
23 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
24Takeofß:GOON,l;
25 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(12,12.5,13);
26SecForc:ALTER,3,-l,l;
27 ACTIVITY;
28 AWAIT,,{{5,1 }},ALL„N0NE,1;
29 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
30FREE,{{5,1}},1;
31 ACTIVITY;
32ALTER,3,+1,1;
33 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
34CREATE,INF,0.0„1,1;
35 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(l,2,4)+16„„"Notify Crews";
36Takeoff4:GOON,l;
37 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(12,12.5,13);
38TALCE:ALTER,3,-1,1;
39 ACTIVITY;
40 AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
41 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
42FREE,{{5,1}},1;
43 ACTIVITY;
44ALTER,3,+1,1;
45 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
46 CREATE,8,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
47 ACTIVITY,, 16„„"Notify Crews";
48 AWAIT,,{{1,1}},ALL„NONE, 1;
49 ACTIVITY;
50FREE,{{1,1}},1;
51 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
52 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
53 ACTIVITY;
54 AWAIT„{{4,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
55 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,4.25,5.25);
56FREE,{{4,1}},1;
57 ACTIVITY;
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58ALTER,1,+1,1;
59 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(16.5,17.5,18.5);
60ALTER,3,-1,1;
61 ACTIVITY„„"Chalkl59cont";
62 Chalkl59cont: AWAIT„{{5,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
63 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(2,3.25,5.25);
64FREE,{{5,1}},1;
65 ACTIVITY;
66ALTER,3,+1,1;
67 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
68 CREATE,2,TRIAG(1,2,4)„3,1;
69 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notiry Crews";
70AWAIT„{{1,1}},ALL„NONE,1;
71 ACTIVITY;
72FREE,{{1,1}},1;
73 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
74 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
75 ACTIVITY;
76 AWAIT,, {{4,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
77 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
78FREE,{{4,1}},1;
79 ACTIVITY;
80ALTER,1,+1,1;
81 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(16.5,17.5,18.5);
82ALTER,3,-1,1;
83 ACTIVITY„„"Chalk234cont";
84 Chalk234cont: AWAIT„{{5,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
85 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
86FREE,{{5,1}},1;
87 ACTIVITY;
88ALTER,3,+1,1;
89 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
90CREATE,2,10„3,1;
91 ACTIVITY,, 15„„"Notify Crews";
92 AWAIT,, {{1,1}},ALL„NONE, 1;
93 ACTIVITY;
94FREE,{{1,1}},1;
95 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(4,4.5,5);
96 ALTER, 1,-1,1;
97 ACTIVITY;
98 AWAIT„{{4,1}},ALL„N0NE,1;
99 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
100FREE,{{4,1}},1;
101 ACTIVITY;
102ALTER,1,+1,1;
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103ACTIVITY,,TRIAG(16.5,17.5,18.5);
104ALTER,3,-1,1;
105 ACTIVITY„„"Chalk678cont";
106 Chalk678cont: AWAIT„{{5,l}},ALL„NONE,l;
107 ACTIVITY„TRIAG(1.75,2.25,3.25);
108FREE,{{5,1}},1;
109 ACTIVITY;
110ALTER,3,+1,1;
111 ACTIVITY„„"terminate";
112 terminate: GOON,l;
113 ACTIVITY;
114COLCT„TNOW,„„l;
INACTIVITY;
116 TERMINATE, 13;
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Appendix D: Tests for Normality

Wilk-Shapiro / Rankit Plot of MODEL1
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150 cases

Wilk-Shapiro / Rankit Plot of MODEL3
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Approximate Wilk-Shapiro 0.9933
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Wilk-Shapiro / Rankit Plot of MODEL4
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150 cases
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